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Abstract 
The mechanism of granting Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) to (inter-)national 
investors for agro-industrial exploitation was the starting point of a wave of large-scale 
land acquisitions in Cambodia since the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) issued 
a respective directive in 2005. 
While ELCs are supposed to combine overall economic benefits on the one hand with 
poverty reduction and the compliance with environmental standards on the other 
hand, it turned out that there is a wide gap between the legal framework, which is 
supposed to govern the granting of ELCs, and its actual implementation on the ground. 
Eventually, the granting of ELCs led to severe human rights violations and several land 
conflicts, involving the local population, investor companies, political and economic 
elites as well as authorities. This situation is especially difficult for the Indigenous 
Peoples of Cambodia, who not just struggle to claim rights to their lands, but for whom 
land is also an essential component of livelihood. 
Drawing on a literature review and the results of a two-month field study, this thesis 
aims at shedding light at the relationship between different actors of society and land 
as a resource in the context of asymmetrical power constellations within the land 
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1 Large-scale land acquisitions: from a global to a Cambodian 
context 
Land as a resource attained central significance in the context of global processes of 
transformation and crisis – such as climate change, the energy transition, population 
growth, the liberalisation of markets, the question of global food security and changing 
patterns of lifestyle with growing consumption rates (cf. von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 
2009: 1; Anseeuw et al. 2012: viii; Borras et al. 2016: 8; Quizon 2012: 7 f.; Dhiaulhaq 
et al. 2014: 205).  
This development led actors across the public and private sector to call for increased 
investments in agriculture. Available data shows that the investors are mostly powerful 
stakeholders of the Global North as well as from emerging countries, who are usually 
targeting poorer countries with a weak land governance system, predominately in 
Africa, followed by Asia and then Latin America (cf. Land Matrix 2016: n. pag.; 
Anseeuw et al. 2012: vii-ix). Furthermore, evidence points to a growing number of 
intra-regional and domestic investments, even though research mostly focuses on 
international cases (cf. Liversage 2010: 3; Anseeuw et al. 2012: viii). Indeed, the 
overall scale and extent of land deals is hard to grasp since land acquisitions cannot 
be understood in a static way, but are rather multi-layered and complex processes 
with fluid actor constellations (cf. Borras et al. 2016: 7). 
Land deals differ widely in terms of their underlying motives, sizes and terms of 
contract (cf. von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009: 1). Proponents argue that those deals 
put land that they define as “vacant”, “fallow” or “under-utilized” into a more 
productive use. Consequently, they claim that win-win situations are created by 
generating profits for the private sector, state revenue through taxes as well as 
employment opportunities and poverty-reducing effects for the local population (cf. 
Borras et al. 2016: 8). The opponents claim that the targeted lands are usually essential 
for smallholder farming households and communities to secure their livelihoods (cf. 
Borras et al. 2016: 35 f.; Liversage 2010: 3-6). They also emphasize how ecological 
systems are being negatively affected and question the alleged improvements in terms 
of productivity, job creation and poverty reduction. These negative impacts led 
scholars to describe large-scale land deals as a new type of the resource curse, 
according to which “citizens of resource-rich countries may suffer from weak 
governance and impoverishment not despite, but rather because of, their abundant 
and widely coveted natural wealth” (De Schutter et al. 2016: 14). 
However, when it comes to the making of land deals, the question is not merely if the 
proponents or the opponents have the better arguments for the case-specific context. 
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Instead, the element of power attains central relevance. Most communities affected 
by land deals do not formally own the land they are living on, but use it under 
customary tenure arrangements. Consequently, they possess less bargaining power 
when it comes to formally claiming possession rights. In combination with a lack of 
transparency that surrounds most land deals, they easily become subject to 
intimidation and displacement, while the private sector usually has a stronger position 
in acquiring land resources, especially in states with a weak governance system (cf. 
von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009: 1 f.; Liversage 2010: 3). 
In Cambodia, the interests in land are diverse: 80 % of the Cambodian population lives 
in rural areas, 23 % of which are living in extreme poverty and thus strongly depend on 
the land they are living on (cf. Oldenburg & Neef, 2014: 50; Pen & Chea 2015: 18). 
Around 54 % of Cambodia’s labour force is working in agriculture, the sector that 
contributes 30.4 % to the annual GDP (cf. The World Bank 2010; The World Bank 2014). 
Different indigenous communities identify land as their central source of livelihood as 
well, not just for traditional agriculture but also because of its spiritual significance 
(cf. Oldenburg & Neef, 2014: 50). 
On the other hand, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) sees land as a potential 
source for development and increased productivity. After several decades of 
communist rule and violent conflicts, Cambodia rapidly started to integrate into the 
global market economy in the 1990s. Against this background, land became a key 
commodity and the RGC started to use land to attract domestic and foreign investment 
and is thereby trying to convert land into capital (cf. RGC 2012 a: 10; Prachvuthy 2011: 
6; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 26;  Pen & Chea: 2015: 17; Global Witness 2013: 7; 
Kampuchea 2012: 42). One instrument, which the RGC implemented to achieve this 
goal, will be analysed as part of this thesis: the granting of “private state land” through 
an Economic Land Concession (ELC)1 contract to a domestic or foreign company to use 
either for agricultural or industrial-agricultural purposes (cf. Oldenburg & Neef, 2014: 
50-52; RGC Ministry of Planning & UNDP Cambodia 2007: 46).  
Most ELCs were being granted in rural areas – a practice that often results in 
overlapping land claims, which are especially difficult to solve since millions of rural 
Cambodians do not possess legally secured land titles (cf. Global Witness 2013: 7). 
Between 2004 and 2013, the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of 
Human Rights (LICADHO) counted 1,162 land conflicts, involving investors, political 
																																																								
1 Under the Cambodian Law, several other concessions, “such as mining concessions, port concessions, 
airport concessions, industrial development concessions, fishing concessions” (RGC 2001: Article 50), exist 
as well. Those do not fall under the provisions of the Land Law and thus will not be further considered 
within the scope of this thesis. 
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and economic elites as well as authorities (cf. Neef & Touch 2016: 124) and resulting 
in an environmental degradation, human rights violations and an increase in rural 
landlessness (cf. Neef et al. 2013: 1085).  
Contextualizing these developments and drawing on results gained through a two-
month field study, by addressing the following research question this thesis aims to 
assess how the granting of ELCs contributes to land conflicts in rural Cambodia and 
affects indigenous communities within a complex actor-land nexus: 
What kind of relationship occurs between different actors of society and land 
as a resource in the context of asymmetrical power constellations within the 
land conflict of Samot Leu Village? 
Subsequently, this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 looks at the land 
governance system in Cambodia with a focus on ELCs, more specifically on the 
mechanisms for allocating ELCs and the impacts on the local population. After having 
established this essential background knowledge, the empirical section of this thesis is 
introduced. To this end, chapter 3 first presents the case study region, in which the 
conflict takes place, namely Samot Leu Village in Seda Commune, which lies in the 
Lumphat Wildlife Sanctuary (LWS), Ratanakiri Province. Second, an overview of the 
employed methodology and research philosophy is given. Third, the analytical 
framework is laid out, which makes use of elements from Political Ecology. The central 
concern of Political Ecology is that socio-political conditions and environmental 
changes influence each other, while the element of power plays a key role in the 
outcome of this interplay (cf. Bohle 2007: 808-810; Krings 2008: 4-9). Thus, when 
analysing the land conflict in this case, it is crucial to look at its root causes with the 
role of the state as one major factor, at the costs and benefits for every stakeholder 
involved and at the types of resistance (cf. Robbins 2004: 11). From this conceptual 
framework, three research objectives for the case study were derived: 
(1) the identification of the land titling situation in the target area, 
(2) the analysis of the impacts of the ELC for Samot Leu Village, and 
(3) the analysis of the land conflict in terms of resistance, attempts for resolution 
and the element of power. 
Based on this three-part division, chapter 4 presents the findings for each objective. 
These results are discussed with reference to the above-mentioned overall research 
question in chapter 5 before the final chapter concludes. 
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2 The land governance system in Cambodia 
The granting of land concessions was first introduced under the French colonial system: 
Already in 1874, so-called “unoccupied” land was granted by the colonial authorities 
to concessionaires under the condition of cultivation within three years (cf. Oldenburg 
& Neef 2014: 52 f.). After independence was gained in 1953, the granting of land 
concessions continued until during the violent rule of the Khmer Rouge Regime from 
1975 to 1979, all cadastral documents were destroyed and private land ownership was 
eliminated. A reintroduction of land concessions came with the Land Law of 1992, 
which was renewed in 2001 and has been enforced ever since (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 
2014: 50, 53; Chamroeun 2012: 316-320). 
This thesis focuses on one of the focal points when looking at today’s land ownership 
situation in Cambodia: ELCs. Accordingly, the following subchapters outline the legal 
framework for granting ELCs, its implementation, the current state of affairs, the 
impacts on the local population with a focus on Indigenous Peoples, while also taking 
into account what kind of land titling opportunities Indigenous Peoples possess. While 
doing so, this thesis primarily bases the use of the term “indigenous” on the criterion 
of self-identification as Indigenous Peoples at the individual and the community level. 
Secondary characteristics are a strong link to surrounding natural resources as well as 
a distinct language, culture, beliefs and social system (cf. APF & OHCHR 2013: 7). 
2.1 Legal framework for Economic Land Concessions 
The foundations for land ownership in Cambodia are laid out in the Land Law of 2001. 
Under this law, land is divided into five categories: (1) private land, (2) state public 
land, (3) state private land, (4) monastery land, and (5) land of indigenous communities 
(cf. RGC 2001: Articles 4-28).  
In the context of this thesis, the third category is of importance because in 2005, Sub-
Decree 146 on ELCs was introduced, defining them as a “mechanism to grant private 
state land through a specific economic land concession contract to a concessionaire to 
use for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploitation” (RGC 2005: Article 2). 
Interestingly, this practice is encouraged by the possibility of converting state public 
land to state private land whenever it loses its public interest (cf. RGC 2001: Article 
16) – even though a definition of “public interest” is not given.  
According to the law, the purposes of ELCs are: 
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“To develop intensive agricultural and industrial-agricultural activities that 
requires [sic!] a high rate and appropriate level of initial capital investment.  
To achieve a specific set of agreements from the investor for developing the 
land in an appropriate and perpetual manner based on a land use plan for the 
area. 
To increase employment in rural areas within a framework of intensification 
and diversification of livelihood opportunities and within a framework of 
natural resource management based on appropriate ecological system. 
To encourage small as well as large investments in economic land concession 
projects. 
To generate state revenues or the provincial or communal revenues through 
economic land use fees, taxation and related services charges.” (RGC 2005: 
Article 3) 
There are two possible methods for granting an ELC: through a competitive solicited 
proposal, which by law is the prioritized option, or through an unsolicited proposal by 
an investor (cf. RGC 2005: Articles 6, 18-24). 
Responsible for the granting is the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) (cf. RGC 2005: Article 29). In cooperation with the Ministry of Environment 
(MoE), the MAFF has to make sure that all preconditions for granting an ELC are met: 
As mentioned above, only state private land is eligible. In addition, four other criteria 
need to be complied with: (1) the land use has to be consistent with the adopted land 
use plan, (2) Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) have to be 
completed, (3) involuntary resettlements by lawful land holders are prohibited and 
there have to be solutions for any resettlement issues, and (4) public consultations 
with local authorities and residents need to be held (cf. RGC 2005: Article 4).  
Moreover, the maximum size of an ELC is 10,000 hectares (cf. RGC 2001: Article 59) 
and the maximum contract duration is by law 99 years2 (cf. RGC 2001: Article 61). The 
yearly rental fees for concessionaires are extremely low and range from 2 to 10 USD/ha 
(cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 57; Prachvuthy 2011: 20; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 
26). 
The above-mentioned aims and criteria show that with the granting of ELCs, the RGC 
tries to combine overall economic benefits on the one hand with poverty reduction 
and the compliance with environmental standards on the other hand (cf. RGC: Article 
5; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 51, 56). With the emergence of many land conflicts 
																																																								
2 In 2015, the RGC declared that all leases will now be limited to 50 years, retroactively cutting already 
existing ELC contracts in half. However, the legal basis for this decision is still in debate (cf. Vida 2015). 
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associated with ELCs it became clear that the RGC failed in living up to its own 
ambiguous objectives.  
When land conflicts peaked in 2012, Prime Minister Hun Sen issued Directive 01 on 
“Measures to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of management of Economic 
Land Concessions”, which had three major components: First, a moratorium on the 
granting of new ELCs was proclaimed. Second, existing ELCs should be reviewed and 
in cases where they did not comply with the law, they should be withdrawn (cf. ADHOC 
2015: 12 f.; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 66; Schoenberger 2015: 1). Third, the so-called 
leopard skin policy was introduced, aiming at a co-existence of ELCs and smallholders 
by demarcating villages and villagers’ farming lands from existing ELCs and assigning 
these cut out areas back to individual users via private land titles (PLT), each no bigger 
than 5 ha per household (cf. ADHOC 2015: 10-13; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 67 f.). In 
2014, the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Environment added in an 
interministerial proclamation that not just farmlands but also graveyards and spiritual 
places should be demarcated during the implementation of the leopard skin policy (cf. 
Open Development Cambodia 2014; Rabe 2013: 13). 
2.2 The implementation gap 
There is a wide discrepancy between the above-described legal framework for ELCs 
and its implementation. This begins with the involved institutions: Even though the 
MAFF is the one responsible for the granting of ELCs, while the MoE is supposed to 
evaluate and mitigate potential environmental impacts, this practice shifted insofar 
as the MoE was also tasked to assign ELCs within protected areas (cf. ADHOC 2015: 12; 
Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 56; Pen & Chea 2015: 18). Additionally, the unsolicited 
proposal became the norm for granting an ELC, even though the law defines the 
competitive solicited proposal as the prioritized method (cf. ADHOC 2015: 12). 
Moreover, several preconditions for the granting of an ELC were usually not complied 
with: For instance, the reclassification from state public to state private land did often 
only take place after the granting of an ELC (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 57). In other 
cases, the maximum size of 10,000 ha was by far exceeded because it became common 
practice that investors used different names and shell companies to claim additional 
land plots (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 58; Pen & Chea 2015: 18; Global Witness 2013: 
3; LICADHO 2009: 17). Furthermore, ELCs frequently lack consistency with the land use 
plan as investors often do not cultivate the land, but seek to use it for timber 
exploitation and leave it fallow afterwards or engage in land speculation (cf. 
Prachvuthy 2011: 21; RGC Ministry of Planning & UNDP Cambodia 2007: 47; Bickel & 
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Löhr 2011: 34). In addition, ESIAs were rarely carried out and/or public consultations 
did not take place. If they did, they were often limited to isolated information events 
without the possibility to veto and/or to actively take part in reshaping the process 
(cf. ADHOC 2015: 14; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 58; Beban & Pou 2014: 15; Prachvuthy 
2011: 20; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 211; Nolte & Voget-Kleschin 2013: 1; Borras et al. 
2016: 38). 
In most cases, people who were faced with an ELC in their territory were not offered 
any compensation for their land. If they were, monetary compensation was usually 
comparatively low, and in case of a relocation, the new land was often smaller, of bad 
quality and/or far away (cf. Inclusive Development International & Equitable Cambodia 
2013: 2; Global Witness 2009: 14; Global Witness 2013: 2; Beban & Pou 2014: iv; Borras 
et al. 2016: 38; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 26; LICADHO 2015 a: 7; ADHOC 2015: 
16 f.). 
The above-mentioned Directive 01, which froze the granting of new ELCs, called for a 
review of existing ones and introduced the leopard skin policy, seemed to be a sign of 
the RGC realizing the conflict potential of the current ELC practice and aiming at an 
improvement. However, the success of the Directive is in question.  
First, because several ELCs were already in the making when the moratorium was 
announced in 2012, at least 33 ELCs were approved afterwards and two more were 
granted in 2013 (cf. ADHOC 2015: 12 f.). 
Another critique is that in order to implement the leopard skin policy, youth 
volunteers, who were not sufficiently trained and had no independent supervision, 
were employed for the demarcation and private titling campaign. The whole procedure 
was very fast-tracked, bypassed existing regulations for land registration and changed 
throughout the process. This made it hard for villagers to keep up with the procedure, 
their options and rights. In combination with the prohibition of civil society groups to 
monitor the process, villagers thus became easily subject to misinformation and 
intimidation (cf. ADHOC 2015: 10-14; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 65-69; Global Witness 
2013: 8; Rabe 2013: 8-20; Schoenberger 2015: 3; Pen & Chea 2015: 25).  
Moreover, there is no confirmed information on how many ELCs have been revoked in 
total. There is also debate on whether only inactive ELCs have been reviewed, while 
the ones surrounded by conflict were less or not at all targeted (cf. Open Development 
Cambodia n.d. a; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 68). However, according to government 
sources, a total of nearly 280,000 ha was cut from 116 ELCs and given back to the 
villagers in the form of PLTs (cf. Titthara 2014). 
Lastly, it is uncertain how the implementation of the Directive will continue in the 
future. First, because the surveying and demarcation activities are moving slowly ever 
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since the programme was resumed in November 2013, after it had stopped in June 
2013 shortly before the general election took place. And second, because the 
Directive’s terminology allows that the granting of ELCs can be recommenced at any 
time (cf. Global Witness 2013: 8; Schoenberger 2015: 2; ADHOC 2014: 11; CCHR 2016: 
12). All in all, the practice of granting ELCs lags far behind its legal framework. A weak 
coordination between different government agencies and levels as well as an 
insufficient harmonization of different instructions result in a selective and arbitrary 
law enforcement, which lacks transparency and accountability and is characterized by 
impunity (cf. Kampuchea 2012: 44 f.; Subedi 2012: para. 92; Amnesty International 
2008: 44).  
2.3 Current state of affairs: facts and figures on ELCs 
Information on existing ELCs, their granting processes and the stakeholders involved is 
hard to find and varies greatly due to a lack of complete and consistent documentation 




 Figure 1: Overview of land concessions in Cambodia (Source: LICADHO 2016 b) 
 
According to a government report of 2015, up until then 1,934,896 ha of land were 
granted to 230 companies via ELCs. Thereof, 1,316,396 ha were granted to 122 
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companies through the MAFF, while 108 companies received their concession from the 
MoE for the remaining 618,500 ha (cf. Kunmakara 2015; Vannak 2015).  
As opposed to this, LICADHO claims that by 2016, an area of 2,139,552 ha was leased 
out in the form of ELCs (cf. LICADHO 2016 b) (see figure 1). This means that more than 
50 % of Cambodia’s arable land is covered by ELCs, of which most are used for rubber 





Figure 2: Rubber plantation in Ratanakiri, Cambodia (Source: Bayer 2016) 
 
Looking at the stakeholders involved, it becomes evident that Cambodian investors 
own the vast majority of ELCs. Second and third, Chinese and Vietnamese companies 
play a major role (cf. LICADHO 2016 b) (see figure 3) – confirming the existence of a 
global trend of intra-regional transactions (cf. chapter 1). There are nearly no 
available numbers on the economic benefits of ELCs. According to newspaper article 
of 2015, the RGC earned around USD 80 million with granting ELCs as well as forests to 
private companies between 2012 and 2015 (cf. Kunmakara 2015). The current picture 
suggests that the prioritisation of large-scale land acquisitions to expand the export 
market potential and attract foreign investments is likely to continue. This is despite 
such comparatively low revenue and a widespread belief that the support of 
smallholders would unlock dormant potentials in terms of employment, local food 
security, benefits for the national market and poverty reduction (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 
2014: 63; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 206-213). 
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2.4 The impacts of ELCs on the local population 
Article 31 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia recognizes human rights as 
outlined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other related conventions. Thereby, the RGC is legally bound to respect, protect and 





Figure 3: Ownership of Economic Land Concessions in Cambodia (Source: LICADHO 2016 c) 
 
However, the above-described practice of granting ELCs is affecting between 400,000 
and 700,000 Cambodians and led to severe human rights violations (cf. Pen & Chea 
2015: 4; LICADHO 2015 a: 6). Those include involuntary resettlements and forced 
evictions of thousands of residents, contributing to a rising level of landlessness, and 
thereby – amongst others – violating the right to adequate housing, food and nutrition, 
water and sanitation, health, work, security of person, freedom of movement, privacy 
and security of home (cf. Open Development Cambodia n.d. a; Inclusive Development 
International & Equitable Cambodia 2013: 41; Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 60-62; Amnesty 
International 2008: 2; Herre & Feodoroff 2014: 8; Borras et al. 2016: 36-39; RGC 
Ministry of Planning & UNDP Cambodia 2007: 47).  
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Conflicts often resulted in violence on both sides: Resistance of villagers was violently 
suppressed, often with military involvement. Houses were set on fire, personal 
belongings destroyed and there is documentation of death threats and even killings of 
activists. On the other hand, armed villagers started to threaten company workers as 
well (cf. Global Witness 2013: 38; Amnesty International 2008: 30-42; LICADHO 2009: 
20 f.; Borras et al. 2016: 45-48; LICADHO 2015 a: 6; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 211). 
Existing dispute resolution institutions implemented by the RGC (cf. Chamroeun 2012: 
332-334; ADHOC 2014: 39) seem to fail when it comes to finding solutions which are 
satisfying for all parties involved. This is because the offical procedures are lengthy 
and often ineffective due to a lack of information sharing and collaboration between 
different government levels, the communities and NGOs, causing administrative 
conflicts and stagnation in conflict solution processes (cf. Ngin et al. 2016: 12). 
Additionally, it is difficult for locals to claim their rights in front of a court due to a 
lack of monetary means, sufficient information and/or trust in the legal system that is 
known to be corrupt (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 59; Amnesty International 2008: 3; 
Supreme National Economic Council 2007: 12).  
Once villagers lose their lands, they often end up renting land, migrating to the city, 
working as day labourers or illegal loggers (cf. ADHOC 2015: 16 f.; Herre & Feodoroff 
2014: 7). In terms of the creation of employment, which was one designated goal of 
ELCs, it is to say that “while providing some employment opportunities, […] no 
evidence of positive income effects of ELCs on households in the areas where ELCs are 
located [could be found]” (Jiao et al. 2015: 317). The reasons for these shortcomings 
are that companies often prefer to hire migrant workers and in cases where jobs for 
locals are provided, they are often temporary or seasonal, provide poor working 
conditions and/or low wages (cf. Herre & Feodoroff 2014: 6-8; Borras et al. 2016: 37;  
Kampuchea 2012: 46; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 27; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 210). 
In some cases, especially involving Indigenous Peoples, people refuse to work for 
foreign companies completely (cf. LICADHO 2009: 19, 27; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 
2011: 27). 
Apart from the negative human rights related effects, severe environmental 
degradation is another major problem. In fact, ELCs are recognized as the main cause 
for Cambodia’s high rate of deforestation (cf. Global Witness 2013: 3, 9; Oldenburg & 
Neef 2014: 62; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 208-211; ADHOC 2014: 34). The result of the 
current land governance situation in Cambodia is that fewer and fewer people exercise 
control over Cambodia’s land resources: 20 % of all land concession areas are held by 
just five tycoons of the ruling Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) (cf. Global Witness 
2013: 9), pointing to a high level of corruption. Looking at the total surface area of 
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Cambodia, 20-30 % of the land area is in the hands of just 1 % of the population – an 
elite that is getting richer while the poor usually do not benefit (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 
2014: 62 f.; Open Development Cambodia n.d. a; Global Witness 2013: 2).  
2.5 Land rights and titling opportunities for Indigenous Peoples 
In Cambodia, there are around 179,000 people who belong to 24 different Indigenous 
Peoples. They manage around 4 million ha of Cambodia’s land area and mostly live in 
the north-eastern provinces of the country – where also 40 % of the ELCs are located 
(cf. Pen & Chea 2015: 4-6, 15; Prachvuthy 2011: 6; Soth 2012: 403 f.; Prachvuthy & 
Van Westen 2011: 26; Rabe 2013: 9). 
For the Indigenous Peoples in Cambodia, land is a necessary means to survive: not just 
in terms of activities like shifting cultivation, the collection of Non-Timber Forest 
Products (NTFP), livestock, hunting and fishing, but also as a concept of identity, 
culture and belief. Hence, in order to understand Indigenous Peoples’ stance in land 
conflicts, it is important to notice that their lands – especially spiritual and burial 
forests – are important components in their cultural and religious lives. Land cannot 
be relocated arbitrarily without damaging the magical and spiritual powers, in which 
the communities believe (cf. Pen & Chea 2015: 6, 9, 25; The Other Cambodia 2013: 
5:51; Beban & Pou 2014: 15; Herre & Feodoroff 2014: 6; Prachvuthy 2011: 10 f.;  Soth 
2012: 400; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 26; Rabe 2013: 9; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 
207; Narim: 2016). 
 
On paper, the rights of Indigenous Peoples are recognized by several international 
instruments, which have been ratified by the RGC. Those are amongst others the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO Convention 169, which 
includes the right to Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) (cf. Pen & Chea: 2015: 4, 9; 
Amnesty International 2008: 22;  Soth 2012: 406-408). Nationally, the 1993 Constitution 
grants Indigenous Peoples equal protection like all Khmers (cf. Soth 2012: 408). 
Moreover, the national Land Law protects Indigenous Peoples’ land rights: 
 
“The lands of indigenous communities are those lands where the said 
communities have established their residences and where they carry out 
traditional agriculture.” (RGC 2001: Article 25) 
 
“Ownership of the immovable properties described in Article 25 is granted by 
the State to the indigenous communities as collective ownership. This 
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collective ownership includes all of the rights and protections of ownership as 
are enjoyed by private owners.” (RGC 2001: Article 26) 
This collective ownership is granted via a Communal Land Title (CLT), with which a 
community can officially register its residential land, agricultural land, reserve land 
for shifting cultivation, spiritual forest land up to 7 ha and burial ground forest land 
up to 7 ha (cf. RGC 2009: Article 6). 
In addition, the national 2002 Forestry Law states amongst others that the harvest of 
spirit trees is prohibited and that forests for shifting cultivation are to be reserved (cf. 
Soth 2012: 410; Dhiaulhaq et al. 2014: 207).  
Furthermore, the 2008 Protected Areas Law introduced a zoning system that divides 
protected areas into core zones, conservation zones, sustainable-use zones and 
community zones: while in core and conservation zones clearance and construction 
activities are prohibited, any development activity in sustainable-use zones and 
community zones needs to undergo ESIAs before being subjected to the RGC’s approval 
(cf. RGC 2008: Article 24, 36). Indigenous Peoples living within or at the border to a 
protected area are granted the possibility to receive forest land of sustainable-use 
zones in the form of a Community Protected Area (CPA) by the MoE. To this end, the 
community enters into an agreement with the Nature Conservation and Protection 
Administration that entails a self-administrative action plan guaranteeing the 
sustainable management of the CPA. While the management plan shall be reviewed 
every 3 years, the CPA agreement is valid for 15 years (cf. RGC 2008: Article 25-28). 
Nonetheless, the community cannot use the CPA for shifting cultivation or residential 
land as any clearance activities are prohibited within a CPA (cf. RGC 2008: 26). 
However, when it comes to claiming their land rights, Indigenous Peoples form one of 
the most vulnerable groups in Cambodia, showing that their rights are still not 
completely recognized and protected (cf. Soth 2012: 411-413). Indeed, many ELCs 
were granted on indigenous land (cf. Pen & Chea 2015: 13; Global Witness 2013: 2; 
Borras et al. 2016: 36; Prachvuthy 2011: 6). One of the contributing factors is the 
missing harmonization between the Land Law, the Forestry Law and the Protected 
Areas Law, including a lack of clear distinction between state public and state private 
land. So if no formal ownership can be proven by the Indigenous Peoples, the land 
belongs to the state by default and might be leased out via ELCs (cf. Neef et al. 2013: 
1087; cf. Pen & Chea 2015: 18; Global Witness 2013: 7-9; Prachvuthy 2011: 15 f.;  Soth 
2012: 413; Prachvuthy & Van Westen 2011: 26). 
This is especially fatal for Indigenous Peoples because the Sub-Decree on CLTs was 
issued not until four years after the Sub-Decree on ELCs. Moreover, the granting of 
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ELCs moves fast, while the process of acquiring a CLT is much slower, lacks sufficient 
enforcement and requires the interaction with three different ministries as depicted 
in table 1. 
 
No. Ministry responsible Simplified steps to obtain a Communal Land Title (CLT) 
1 Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) Identifies and recognizes the identity of the 
indigenous community as a collective group 
2 Ministry of Interior (MoI) Registers the indigenous community as a legal entity
3 Ministry of Land Management, Urban 
Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) 
Grants the Communal Land Title (CLT) after 
measuring and demarcating the land 
Table 1: Simplified procedure to obtain a Communal Land Title (CLT) (Source: own draft based on Oldenburg & Neef 
2014: 68; Prachvuthy 2011: 16-18) 
The simplified procedure shown in table 1 can be split up to 29 sub-steps, each of 
which involves extensive administrative work for the Indigenous Peoples – such as 
setting up working groups and committees to prove that the indigenous community 
recognizes themselves as such, filling out applications, developing land-use maps and 
formulating internal rules. Usually, the communities lack the necessary monetary 
means, information and expertise for this procedure and are dependent on support 
from NGOs (cf. Pen & Chea: 2015: 12 f.; 25; Prachvuthy 2011: 16-18; Lim & Nan 2015: 
2; Kampuchea 2012: 45; CCHR 2016: 17). 
Due to the length of the procedure, the indigenous community is to be granted interim 
protective measures (IPM) in between step two and three, which “include the 
prohibition of sale, purchase, lease or transfer of lands under application for 
registration” (Pen & Chea: 2015: 13). However, field study shows that those measures 
were rarely taken, resulting in a further loss of land for the Indigenous Peoples the 
longer the process takes (cf. Pen & Chea: 2015: 13, 24). 
When the previously mentioned Directive 01 was introduced, things got even more 
complicated because it caused the CLT process to halt. Thus, communities that already 
entered the procedure, i.e. were already registered as legal entities, were forced into 
a waiting position (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 69 f.). Moreover, individuals from 
indigenous communities that did not yet enter the CLT process were offered PLTs 
instead. Due to various negative implications for Indigenous Peoples resulting from 
those private titles – such as further loss of communal lands since a PLT is limited to 5 
ha, a destabilization of community cohesion and solidarity, and an ineligibility to 
receive a CLT once a PLT is accepted (cf. Pen & Chea 2015: 16, 22-26; Rabe 2013: 7, 
23; CCHR 2016: 13) – previous studies state that the vast majority of Indigenous Peoples 
favours CLTs over PLTs. However, many villagers were put under pressure to accept 
PLTs, often with the use of intimidation and misinformation as they were told that it 
     
	
Large-scale land acquisitions in rural Cambodia | 15
is a PLT or nothing at all (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 69-73; Pheap & Peter 2013; Pen 
& Chea 2015: 28; Global Witness 2013: 8; Rabe 2013: 20-24; Peter & Pheap 2013). 
Recognizing the overlaps between the different titling schemes, the MLMUPC later 
stated that it would be possible to transform PLTs into CLTs in the future, but it is still 
unclear how this will be done (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 72; Rabe 2013: 13). 
As a result, of Cambodia’s 458 indigenous communities only 11 obtained a CLT by the 
beginning of 2016 (cf. CCHR 2016: 1). Moreover, there are cases where Indigenous 
Peoples still suffered encroachment on community land despite them possessing a CLT 
(cf. CCHR 2016: 38). Again, it becomes evident that there is a wide discrepancy 
between the legal recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ land rights on the one hand, and 
the poor enforcement of this legal framework on the other hand. 
3 Studying the actor-land nexus 
The above-described concept of ELCs, used by the RGC as an instrument to promote 
“development”, is one characteristic of a neoliberalisation that led to a successive 
commodification of land, labour and capital (cf. Springer 2009: 273 f.; Polanyi 1944). 
These developments are associated with different costs and benefits that are unevenly 
distributed among society, making the situation prone to conflicts (cf. Springer 2009: 
273 f.). The specific conflict, which is analysed within the scope of this thesis, occurs 
in the form of overlapping claims on land, which are the result of an ELC that was 
partially granted on indigenous land. Hence, we are looking at an interaction between 
different parts of society with the environment, while the key factor of influence when 
it comes to the outcome of this interplay is power.  
In order to further analyse this actor-land nexus, the following sub-chapters will first 
introduce the study region, second explain the methodology that was applied during 
the fieldwork, and third present the theoretical and analytical framework, from which 
the research objectives for the case study are derived. 
3.1 Study region: Samot Leu Village in Lumphat District, Ratanakiri 
Province 
Samot Leu Village was established around 1951 and is one of seven villages, which 
together constitute Seda Commune (cf. Interview Village Chief). The village is located 
at the north-eastern border of the LWS, which was established in 1993 and comprises 
an area of 250,000 ha (cf. Open Development Cambodia 2016 a).  
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While the LWS lies across Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri Province, Samot Leu Village is 
located in the latter (see figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: The study region: Samot Leu Village in Lumphat District, Ratanakiri Province, and the surrounding provinces 
(Source: own compilation based on data from Open Development Cambodia n.d. b) 
Prime Minister Hun Sen called the northeast of Cambodia the “fourth economic pole” 
(after Phnom Penh, Siem Reap and Sihanoukville), because of its potential for agro-
industrial development. Indeed, Ratanakiri’s high soil quality makes it extremely 
attractive for agro-industrial companies and thus ELCs (cf. Rabe 2013: 6, 11; Pheaktra 
2008). According to the village chief, the village itself comprises 200 ha (see figure 5 
& 6). 
 
                
 
 Figure 5: Residential area of Samot Leu Village
 (Source: Bayer 2016) 
Figure 6: Residential area of Samot Leu Village 
(Source: Bayer 2016) 
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Additionally, there are 800 ha of rice fields and farmland (cf. Interview Village Chief). 
The agricultural land is distributed among the villagers in a way that one family usually 
cultivates a field of circa 1 to 2 ha, and farmland of 1 to 5,5 ha (cf. Interview Villager 
1-16).  
There are around 864 people living in the Samot Leu, of which 442 are female (cf. 
Open Development Cambodia 2008). The vast majority of the villagers belong to the 
Tumpoun ethnicity, with some Khmer, Jarai and Lao inhabitants, who usually moved 
to the village for marriage reasons (cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1; Interview 
Village Chief; Interview Villager 1-16). One household is made up of one to four families 
living together (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 1-16) (see figure 7 & 8).  
                 
 
 Figure 7: Household in Samot Leu Village 
 (Source: Bayer 2016) 
 
Figure 8: Household in Samot Leu Village 
(Source: Bayer 2016) 
 
In terms of access to water and sanitation, there are two public water pumps in the 
village but apart from this, there is neither running water nor are there any latrines. 
Moreover, there is no electricity supply and only few families own a small generator 
(cf. participant observation at Samot Leu). 
The villagers used to practice traditional shifting rice cultivation in a three-year 
rotation cycle.  
However, due to the changing land ownership situation in the area that leads to 
shrinking available land resources, they needed to change this pattern to a stationary 
form of rice cultivation (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 1-16) (see figure 
9 & 10).  
Moreover, they diversified their crop to cassava, mung beans and cashew nuts (cf. 
Interview Villager 1-16), and some mango, sugarcane, banana, chili, lemongrass and 
peanuts (cf. Interview Villager 4, 6), which they usually sell, while using the rice for 
subsidence. Besides the agricultural activities, the villagers usually own some cattle, 
pigs and chicken and they engage in fishing, hunting and NTFP collection to supplement 
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their diet (cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1; Interview Village Chief; Interview 
Villager 1-16). 
 
                        
 
 Figure 9: Rice field in Samot Leu Village
 (Source: Bayer 2016) 
Figure 10: Drying rice in Samot Leu Village    
 (Source: Bayer 2016) 
3.2 Research methodology 
This study employs a qualitative approach. The first step was an extensive desk-based 
literature review, which was conducted to provide background information on the land 
governance system in Cambodia and to develop the analytical framework so the 
outcomes of the fieldwork could be properly contextualized.  
During the fieldwork, which took place in October and November 2016, data was 
primarily gathered through semi-structured problem-centred interviews. Table 2 
provides an overview of the interviewed people3.  
The interviews were based on written guidelines of questions (see annex 1-6), which 
were prepared in advance with reference to the research objectives and adjusted in 
the field. Thereby, it was possible to generate comparable data, but at the same time 
the medium openness that characterizes this type of interview allowed to follow new 
leads during the interview (cf. Bernard 2000: 191; Lamnek 1995: 70-75; Witzel 1989: 
230-255). All interviews also contained some unstructured and more open 
conversational phases with the aim “to get people to open up and let them express 
themselves in their own terms, and at their own pace” (Bernard 2000: 191). 
Save Cambodia’s Wildlife (SCW)4 functioned as a supporting partner in this research in 
terms of providing background information as well as facilitating the interview 
appointments with the relevant NGOs and local authorities and joining these interviews 
for translation.  
																																																								
3 Unfortunately, despite several efforts the investor company involved in the land conflict refused to 
meet for an interview. 
4 SCW is a registered Cambodian NGO since 2002. Its mission is the conservation of natural resources and 
wildlife habitats by engaging primarily in the areas of education and community mobilization as well as 
integrated alternative livelihoods (cf. SCW 2016 b). 
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Spokesperson Corresponding organisation / authority / group Date & location 
Type of data 
gathering & 
reference used 
in this thesis 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
Mr. Chan Vicheth, 
Programme Manager 





Mr. Bov Sophea,  
Head of Office 
Cambodian League for the 
Promotion and Defense of 





Mr. Lok Chhay Thi, 
Ratanakiri Provincial 
Coordinator 






Mr. Hub Borin, Communal 
Land Titling Project 
Coordinator 
Indigenous Community 













Mr. Kit Touch, Senior Good 
Governance Programme 
Officer 






Mr. Ali Al-Nasani, Country 
Director 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 5.12.2016, Phnom 






Mr. San Sanny, Deputy of 
Lumphat Wildlife Sanctuary 





Mr. Tun Sovanny, Vice 
Director of the Office of 
Planning 
Department of Environment, 




Mr. Me Phorn, Deputy 
Director of the Rural 
Community Development 
Office 
Department of Rural 





Mr. Tim Sinath, Deputy 
Director 
Department of Land 
Management, Urban Planning 













Mr. Siphat Touch, Deputy 
Director of the Community 
Development Department 





Mr. Chou Sophark, Director 
of the Protected Areas in 
the Eastern Mekong Region 
Department 





Male CPA Seda Committee 
Member and villager 
CPA Seda Committee;






Female CPA Seda Committee 












16 separately interviewed 
villagers (7 male, 9 female), 
each representing a 
different household 




Table 2: Primary data collection (Source: own compilation 2016) 
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While the interview with the representative of the MRD was held in English, a private 
translator, who belonged to the Tumpoun ethnicity, was employed for the fieldwork 
in Samot Leu Village. 
Since ELCs are a very sensitive and controversial issue in Cambodia, the interviews 
were conducted without recording so that the informants were not placed in any risk 
due to their cooperation and were more likely to answer freely. 
In Samot Leu Village, direct participant observation was used to supplement the 
information gained through the interviews, especially in terms of the relevance of land 
for the villagers in their daily lives. Because the observations were performed without 
standardisation it was possible to change perspectives during the fieldwork without 
being constrained by a prior selection of specific aspects (cf. Reuber & Pfaffenbach 
2005: 123-127). 
Lastly, the attending of a panel discussion on the impacts of ELCs and a presentation 
of the Indigenous People Support Organisation (ICSO) on their work (see table 1), as 
well as the continuous review of newspaper articles during the fieldwork contributed 
to developing a deeper understanding of the issue. 
Of course, the approach used in this research has its limitations: Constraints in time 
and resources for data collection naturally limit the scope of this study, resulting in a 
lack of generalizability of the research findings.  
Another issue is the risk of being misinformed. This might has happened unintentionally 
or in the form of purposely giving inaccurate responses and holding back information 
due to the controversy of the topic in the current public discourse. Furthermore, 
information may have gotten lost or misrepresented due to the language barrier, which 
required a translator in most of the interviews. 
Closely connected to these limitations is the reflection on the role of the researcher 
during the fieldwork. As the research topic is an on-going conflict, it was important to 
not get involved in the conflict solving process, but to keep a certain distance, which 
was necessary to equally take into account the viewpoints of all conflict parties and 
to live up to the researcher’s rather passive role of understanding and documenting 
instead of actively engaging. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the 
interviewed people inevitably had certain pre-defined images and assumptions about 
the researcher, whose presence might has given rise to certain expectations and has 
influenced the acting and answering of the interviewees. 
Additionally, the researcher’s own background needs to be critically reflected: A 
common position of international scholars in the context of Cambodia’s land sector is 
a sharp critique on its underlying development model, primarily because it goes hand 
in hand with high deforestation to make room for large-scale plantations. While this 
     
	
Large-scale land acquisitions in rural Cambodia | 21
may seem to be a reasonable argument, one has to be aware of the fact that this 
critique mostly comes from a normative Eurocentric viewpoint, i.e. from nations, 
whose development model was based on high deforestation as well when they 
transformed from agrarian to industrial societies. 
The employed overall research philosophy follows an interpretative paradigm, meaning 
that this study seeks to comprehend the socially constructed realities of the people 
involved in the land conflict. Since the interpretive researcher adopts relativism, all 
these realities are considered to be equally valid (cf. Neumann 2014: 109). Vice versa, 
as the western researcher brings her own world views and narratives to the study 
environment, qualitative research is inevitably the researcher’s subjective 
interpretation of the interviewees’ individually experienced realities. Therefore, it 
needs to be pointed out that the worldview of the observed and interviewed people 
can never be fully accessed by the above-mentioned methodology and absolute 
neutrality and objectivity cannot be claims of this research (cf. Lamnek 2010: 32; 
Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005: 107-115; Mosse 2006: 949 f.). Keeping this in mind, this 
study’s objective is to better understand and put into context the experienced realities 
of the stakeholders involved in the land conflict. 
3.3 Political Ecology as analytical framework 
This study is embedded in the research perspective of Political Ecology. The central 
concern of Political Ecology is the relationship between socio-political conditions on 
the one hand and environmental changes on the other. The core hypothesis is that 
social and political processes as well as varying power structures and interest 
constellations always in part determine the characteristics of an environmental change 
(cf. Bohle 2007: 808-810; Krings 2008: 4-9). Vice versa, those changes result in costs 
and benefits for different stakeholders, producing an asymmetrical distribution of 
“winners” and “losers” (cf. Robbins 2004: 11). This reciprocity of human-nature-
interaction takes place on and across the local, regional, national and global level (cf. 
Schmidt 2014: 21). 
Political Ecology identifies the state as one major stakeholder in this scenario and 
claims that the state and related actors governmentalize nature and “thereby 
enhancing control over both natural resources and rural/indigenous people” (Neef & 
Touch 2016: 127). To help explore the strategies, which the government employs to 
do so, Robbins defines the state on three different levels: First, the state’s way of 
thinking and acting is characterized by a simplification of environmental issues. This 
narrowing of vision is sometimes necessary to take certain steps of action, but bears 
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the risk of failed planning since it partially ignores local realities (cf. Robbins 2008: 
206-209; Neef et al. 2013: 1090). Second, the state is in constant interaction with 
different stakeholders as well as nature as a non-human element. This creates a 
complex network, within which the state is prone to different external influences that 
might lead to changes in his own course of action (cf. Robbins 2008: 209-212). Lastly, 
the state has major influence on the production and propagation of (environmental) 
knowledge. Hence, he plays a key role when it comes to shaping the prevalent public 
discourse and development model (cf. Robbins 2008: 212-216). 
This means that a discussion about nature has always a political component. In fact, 
this is true for any kind of definition of nature since people think – consciously or 
unconsciously – in political categories, as they understand nature as something worth 
protecting, something finite and/or something exploitable. Against this background, 
the stance of this thesis is that the perception of nature is a social construct and 
statements on nature base on an anthropocentric understanding of the very same (cf. 
Siebert 2005: 11; Schmidt 2014: 21). The awareness of this constructivism allows 
revealing the diverse interests that underlie the actions of different stakeholders in 
human-nature-scenarios by employing tools of Political Ecology. 
Robbins describes these tools with the metaphor of the “Hatchet and Seed”. Hatchet 
means that Political Ecology questions prevalent views on nature and critically 
deconstructs phenomena in terms of their inherent political and individual power 
structures as well as interest constellations. Seed is a metaphor for the normative 
stance of Political Ecology, i.e. the belief that there are alternative ways to act and 
react in situations of human-nature-interaction. Hence, Political Ecology is not just a 
way of diagnostic analysis but also aims at proposing alternatives of action in terms of 
a future resource management (cf. Robbins 2004: 12-16; Mayer-Tasch 1999: 14-16; 
Forsyth 2003: 276). 
The overall goal of Political Ecology is to reveal the political dimension of 
environmental systems by exploring (1) the root causes of an environmental change 
and/or conflict, (2) the ways in which people are benefitting and/or suffering from it, 
and (3) the forms of resistance and/or socio-political movements that arise as a 
reaction to change or conflict (cf. Robbins 2004: 11).  
In terms of the in number (1) mentioned root causes it is important to not just look at 
the proximate causes but also to pay attention to the more distant factors that 
eventually led to the outbreak of conflict (cf. Wisner et al. 2003: 87). Within the 
Cambodian land sector, the governance system and its in part dysfunctional 
institutions, which are characterised by corruption, is one central issue to consider in 
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this context because land deals and corruption seem to not just co-exist but are 
mutually reinforcing (cf. Global Witness 2016: para 4).  
Even though there is no universally accepted definition of corruption, one can 
differentiate petty corruption from grand corruption: While the former includes the 
exchange of small amounts of money and the granting of favours, the latter takes place 
on a larger scale and also involves the highest levels of government (cf. UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2004: 1). Corruption may take transactional forms like bribes and can 
also be institutionalised, e.g. when decision-making in state bodies is skewed to the 
advantage of companies or political elites (cf. Global Witness 2016: para. 3). Evidence 
suggests that both forms take place in Cambodia, which ranks on place 150 of 167 of 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (cf. Transparency 
International 2016). It lies in the nature of corruption that it is kept secret and is thus 
hard to identify and to measure.  
However, previous studies showed that corruption may occur at six stages of the land 
acquisition process: (1) the demarcation of land and titling procedures, (2) the design 
of land use schemes and the classification of land as e.g. “underutilized” or “vacant”, 
(3) the use of “public interest” provisions to justify land deals, (4) the selling or leasing 
of land to investors, (5) the employment of remedies in land conflict complaints, and 
(6) the monitoring of company obligations after the acquisition (cf. De Schutter et al. 
2016: 24-29). Concerning the issue of social movements and resistance, Scott defines 
resistance as any acts by e.g. a community that are intended to change certain claims 
made by other stakeholders that would affect the community (cf. Scott 1986: 22). 
Thus, resistance aims at bringing about a positive change (cf. Sokphea 2016: 192). 
Within the context of land conflicts, this change is a direct outcome like getting land 
back or receiving compensation. The acts of resistance to achieve this outcome can be 
targeted at both the government and/or the companies directly (cf. Soule 2009: 51). 
Moreover, they do not necessarily take the form of collective action (cf. Scott 1986: 
22) and might be hidden or public, peaceful or violent, spontaneous or organized (cf. 
Neef & Touch 2016: 139). A general differentiation can be made between the 
employment of institutional and non-institutional tactics. While the former are e.g. 
petitions or peaceful protests, the latter take the form of more violent illegal acts (cf. 
Sokphea 2016: 187-191).  
In the context of this thesis, getting support from NGOs, which can be described as an 
institutional tactic, is important to mention. This tactic falls under what Tria Kerkvliet 
calls advocacy politics and “involves direct and concerted efforts to support, criticise, 
and oppose authorities, their policies and programs, or the entire way in which 
resources are produced and distributed within an organisation or a system of 
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organisations” (Tria Kerkvliet 2009: 232). The advocates are often organisations but 
might also be individuals or unorganized groups (cf. Tria Kerkvliet 2009: 232). 
The government has the choice to respond to these acts of resistance by either ignoring 
them, concession, repression, or a combination of the latter two (cf. Piven & Cloward 
1986: 50). The companies on the other hand choose between ignoring and concession, 
depending on if they are addressed directly, if their reputation or revenue is 
threatened and/or if the government does or does not concede (cf. King 2008: 7). 
Taking the above-described elements of Political Ecology into consideration and 
transferring them to the context of the land conflict the following research objectives 
guide the empirical study:  
(1) Identifying the land titling situation in the target area,  
(2) Analysing the implications of the ELC for the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu 
Village, and  
(3) Analysing the characteristics of the conflict situation in terms of resistance, 
attempts for resolution and power imbalances. 
4 Results 
To answer the above-mentioned three research objectives, the following chapter 
draws on the results gained during the fieldwork phase. Subsequently, the different 
land use claims and (ongoing) titling schemes will be examined first. Second, the 
impacts of the ELC on Samot Leu Village will be analysed from the perspective of the 
villagers as well as the local authorities. Third, the tactics of resistance, attempts for 
resolution and the element of power within the conflict situation will be investigated. 
4.1 Overlapping land use claims 
The land titling situation in and around Samot Leu Village is hard to properly identify. 
As previously mentioned, during the Khmer Rouge Regime all cadastral documents 
were destroyed. Since then, the RGC developed national maps of the surface area 
including residential and cultivated land, but those land use plans are mostly 
incoherent, non-transparent and the community boundaries stated in these plans are 
often not accepted by the communities themselves (cf. Presentation ICSO; Interview 
Lumphat). Thus, overlapping land use claims are bound to occur. 
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4.1.1 Economic Land Concession 
In this case, we are looking at an overlap between community land and an ELC. This 
ELC was granted in June 2012 – only one month before the moratorium on ELCs was 
announced – to the Cambodian tycoon Rat Sokhorn for the purpose of “agro-industry 
and rubber plantation investment” (cf. RGC 2012 b). In total, the ELC comprises 9,000 
ha of land and was initially granted for 70 years by the MoE (cf. RGC 2012 b) (see figure 
11). 
Figure 11: Location of the Economic Land Concession (ELC) (Source: own compilation based on data from Open 
Development Cambodia n.d. b) 
 
Interestingly, the sub-decree on the reclassification of the respective area as state 
private land – which is a necessary precondition that needs to be fulfilled before an 
ELC can be granted – was issued not until two months after the granting (cf. RGC 2012 
c). At the time of the fieldwork, the company already cleared the majority of the 
forestland within the ELC boundary and started to plant cashew nut trees in parts of 
the area (cf. Interview CLEC). As the ELC lies within a sustainable-use zone of the LWS, 
according to the 2008 Protected Areas Law, additional ESIAs needed to be carried out. 
However, no ESIAs or consultations with the residents took place prior to the granting 
of the ELC (cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1; Interview CPA Committee Member 
2; Interview Villager 8). It becomes evident that the granting decision was made on a 
national level without taking the local reality of the actual land use situation into 
account, leading inevitably to conflicts on the ground: To be precise, around 2,000 ha 
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of the ELC area is on land, which the villagers of Samot Leu claim to be theirs (cf. 
Seangly 2016; SCW 2016 a: 3). Of this 2,000 ha, the company already cleared between 
500 and 1,000 ha (cf. Interview ICSO; Interview ADHOC; Interview LWS; Interview DoE). 
Two more recent developments need to be mentioned when looking at this particular 
ELC: First, in 2015, the contract duration of the ELC was reduced to 50 years based on 
results of an inter-ministerial committee meeting for assessment, measurement and 
evaluation of some ELCs (cf. RGC 2015). Second, in mid 2016, the ELC was transferred 
from Rat Sokhorn to the Chinese Zumvang company (cf. Interview SCW; Interview LWS; 
Interview Lumphat). The circumstances of this ownership transfer remain opaque as 
no interviewed stakeholder had information on this matter. Generally, those transfers 
are prohibited (cf. Open Development Cambodia 2012), but as they bring benefits for 
the companies, “they found a way to make it look legal” (Mr. Siphat Touch, MRD). 
Aside from this already granted Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC, there are three other 
types of land titles which are relevant in this case: an on-going CLT application, a CPA 
process and already issued PLTs for some villagers. 
4.1.2 Communal Land Title 
In terms of the CLT, the process for Samot Leu started already in 2008, facilitated by 
ICSO (cf. Interview ICSO). As described in chapter 2.5, a CLT is an official certificate, 
with which Indigenous Peoples can prove their land ownership.  
Yet, the CLT application for Samot Leu has been on-going for more than eight years 
now because it is made up of 29 sub-steps, which involve the interaction with three 
different ministries and require extensive administrative work, making NGO support 
inevitably (cf. chapter 2.5): For instance, several steps – like certain dissemination and 
endorsement events – require the presence of government representatives, who often 
postpone those events and thereby delay the entire process. Another reason for the 
length of the procedure is that there are only two government employees at the 
provincial level of the MoI, who are in charge of the registration of indigenous 
communities as legal entities (cf. Presentation ICSO). Moreover, it is difficult to draft 
the CLT map because the notions of the RGC, the village and the neighbouring villages 
on where the border should run usually differ, resulting in a lengthy re-drafting and 
re-verifying cycle (cf. Presentation ICSO; Interview Lumphat). 
Apart from the workload and complexity, money is a major obstacle in the application 
process. It is estimated that the first part of the procedure, i.e. the identity 
recognition by the MRD (see table 1), costs between USD 10,000 and USD 20,000 (cf. 
CCHR 2016: 18). Another matter of expense that becomes relevant at several points of 
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the process are travel expenses for government representatives, who need to come to 
the village for certain events as mentioned above. All these costs need to be covered 
by the NGOs, which facilitate the application, because the MoI and the MRD do not 
allocate any funding for CLT purposes (cf. Interview CLEC; Interview DRD; Interview 
DLMUPC). The MLMUPC is the only ministry that has some budget reserved for the CLT 
process (cf. Interview DLMUPC): USD 300,000 per year for the final step of the CLT 
procedure for up to 10 communities (cf. CCHR 2016: 19) – which is not much considering 
that around 447 indigenous communities still do not have a CLT (cf. CCHR 2016: 1).  
As Indigenous Peoples heavily depend on NGO budgets for the CLT application, the 
NGOs are dependent on international funding to fulfil this task. However, this 
international funding is not a reliable and constant source of monetary input, making 
the CLT programme prone to disruptions. According to the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung in 
Phnom Penh, this becomes especially evident when looking at the recent dispute 
between the German government and the RGC, in which the former wanted the RGC 
to strengthen the CLT program, i.e. issue more CLTs per year. But because the RGC 
refused to prioritize CLT applications, Germany eventually decided to withdraw 
funding from the land sector completely (cf. Interview Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung). 
 
Communal Land Title (CLT) request of Samot Leu Village 
Type of land Eligible for a CLT by law Requested seize Surplus amount 
Residential land incl. 
meeting hall Yes 24.65 ha - 
Agricultural land Yes 1,076.92 ha - 
Reserve land for 
agriculture  Yes 1,728.55 ha - 
 
Spiritual forest Yes, up to 7 ha 37.12 ha 30.12 ha 
Burial ground Yes, up to 7 ha 23.09 ha 16.09 ha 
 
Protected forest No 9,696.17 ha 9,696.17 ha 
Private land No 133.13 ha 133.13 ha 
Reserve residential land No 88.81 ha 88.81 ha 
Reserve land for a health 
centre No 34.12 ha 34.12 ha 
Reserve land for a 
pagoda No 27.83 ha 27.83 ha 
Reserve land for a 
primary school No 1.17 ha 1.17 ha 
Reserve land for a 
secondary school No 32.14 ha 32.14 ha 
TOTAL  12,903.7 ha 10,059.58 ha 
Table 3: Communal Land Title (CLT) request of Samot Leu Village (Source: own compilation based on RGC 2009 and 
CLT draft map by ICSO) 
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For Samot Leu Village, ICSO completed step 26 of 29 in October 2016, meaning that 
they submitted the CLT application to the Department of Land Management, Urban 
Planning and Construction on the Provincial Level (DLMUPC) and are now waiting for 
the department to go to the field to verify the GPS points of the proposed CLT area 
(cf. Interview ICSO).  
However, when interviewing Mr. Tim Sinath, the Deputy Director of the DLMUPC, he 
was quite sceptical about the application’s chances of success: First, because the total 
requested CLT seize is 12,903.7 ha (see table 3 and figure 12), and he claims that this 
would be too much for just one village (cf. Interview DLMUPC; Interview DRD 2016). 
Yet, except for the regulations depicted in Table 3, the Land Law contains no 
paragraph on the total maximum amount of land that a community can get in the form 
of a CLT (cf. Interview DLMUPC). This makes a decision on CLT applications even more 
complicated, because the company’s idea of drawing the boundary based on the 
villagers’ current farm- and residential land clashes with the villagers’ traditional 
notion of including burial grounds, spiritual forests and land for shifting cultivation – 
land, which only looks vacant to the eye of someone not living in the area (cf. Interview 
MRD). 
However, considering the provision that for a CLT only residential land, agricultural 
land, reserve land for shifting cultivation, spiritual forest land up to 7 ha and burial 
ground forest land up to 7 ha are eligible (cf. chapter 2.5), it becomes obvious that 
the application of Samot Leu does indeed exceed the allowed limits in terms of burial 
ground and spiritual forest land by around 46 ha (see table 3).  
Additionally, the application includes the request for 9,696.17 ha of protected 
forestland and circa 184 ha of reserve residential land for housing and specific social 
infrastructural buildings – purposes that are not mentioned as eligible for a CLT in the 
respective Sub-Decree at all (see table 3).  
When looking at previously granted CLTs in Cambodia and putting the square measures 
in relation to the village sizes one can derive an average CLT size of 8.7 ha per family 
(cf. Open Development Cambodia 2016 b). Transferred to Samot Leu, which comprises 
around 220 families, this would add up to a CLT of 1,914 ha – which is nearly 11,000 
ha less than requested.  
Second, most parts of the requested area are classified as conservation zone within 
the LWS (cf. Interview LWS; Interview DLMUPC). This means that any clearance and 
construction activities – which would inevitably take place within a CLT as the villagers 
would use the land for agriculture and building houses – are prohibited according to 
the Protected Areas Law (cf. RGC 2008: Article 23). 
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Figure 12: Area requested for a Communal Land Title (CLT) by Samot Leu Village (Source: own compilation based on 
data from Interview ICSO and Open Development Cambodia n.d. b) 
 
As such, the granting of this area as a CLT will be less likely or at least more 
complicated, because a reclassification of the land would be necessary. 
4.1.3 Community Protected Area 
Since March 2014, SCW is working on a CPA application for two villages, including 
Samot Leu, under the name “CPA Seda” (cf. Interview SCW; Interview DoE). As 
described in chapter 2.5, a CPA is a forest area, which is granted to a community by 
the MoE and is protected by the residing villages for a period of 15 years through a 
self-administrative management plan. While SCW and the Department of Environment 
(DoE) are working together on the establishment of the CPA, the budget comes entirely 
from SCW (cf. Interview Lumphat). Table 4 depicts the necessary steps for its 
establishment, showing that the application procedure for a CPA is by far easier than 
the one for a CLT, mostly because it is only needed to interact with one ministry. By 
November 2016, CPA Seda was in step 5 of the process. That the procedure is taking 
two and a half years already can be explained by two complications, the first one being 
an overlap with ICSO’s work: SCW’s targeted CPA was overlapping with ICSO’s targeted 
CLT area for Samot Leu. As both SCW and ICSO received funding from Oxfam America 
at the time, they held a conflict meeting in summer 2014, during which it was decided 
that SCW should look for another area suitable to establish a CPA.	
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No. Steps for the establishment of a Community Protected Area (CPA) 
1 Assessment of potential CPAs involving interested communities 
2 Community meetings to discuss the CPA establishment 
3 Forest assessment with community representatives 
4 Definition of the CPA boundary 
5 Formation of a CPA Committee 
6 Conduct of a CPA needs assessment and forest inventory 
7 Development of a CPA management plan 
8 Entering in an agreement with the Ministry of Environment (MoE) 
9 Monitoring and evaluation of the CPA 
Table 4: Procedure to obtain a Community Protected Area (CPA) (Source: own compilation based on       
Interview SCW 2016) 
However, when by 2015 the CLT application was still not successful and the Rat 
Sokhorn / Zumvang company started to clear community land to the dismay of the 
villagers, the DoE requested SCW to continue their CPA plans in the originally targeted 
area (cf. Interview SCW; Interview CPA Committee Member 1).  
Second, there was an overlap of 2,018 ha between the targeted CPA and the ELC. Thus, 
the CPA process was halted until on 11 October 2016, SCW held a joint meeting with 
representatives of Samot Leu Village, the DoE and the LWS. During this meeting, it was 
unanimously decided to exclude the overlap area from the CPA application and take 
new GPS points for the remaining 3,157 ha of targeted CPA land to proceed with the 
application (see figure 13) (cf. participant observation at Samot Leu; Interview CPA 
Committee Member 1; Interview CPA Committee Member 2; Interview DoE 2016). 
SCW as well as the DoE seem assertive that the application will be successful now that 
the disputed area is excluded (cf. Interview SCW; Interview LWS; Interview DoE). On 
the contrary, one of the CPA Committee Members does not feel confident concerning 
the outcome of the CPA application because of the length of the process so far (cf. 
Interview CPA Committee Member 1). 
When looking at the regulations outlined in the Protected Areas Law, it is to say that 
the targeted CPA is – like the targeted CLT area – a conservation zone, and thus, by 
law not eligible for a CPA unless the area would be reclassified as a sustainable-use 
zone beforehand. 
4.1.4 Private Land Titles 
Having described the on-going CPA and CLT procedures, the third and final land titling 
scheme in the target area are PLTs: The interviews with the villagers of Samot Leu 
revealed that some of them (4 out of 16 villagers) received PLTs in the course of the 
     
	
Large-scale land acquisitions in rural Cambodia | 31
leopard skin policy implemented as part of Directive 01 (cf. chapter 2.1) (cf. Interview 
Village Chief; Interview Villager 2, 5, 6, 12, 16). 
 
 
Figure 13: Targeted Community Protected Area (CPA) for Seda Commune (Source: own compilation based on data from 
Interview SCW and Open Development Cambodia n.d. b) 
 
Different from other studies’ findings stating that Indigenous Peoples often were 
pressured into taking PLTs and generally preferred a CLT over a PLT (cf. chapter 2.5), 
the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu were very satisfied with their PLTs because these 
titles offered them immediate protection at least for some of their farmland (cf. 
Interview Villager 5, 6, 12, 16): 
“The Prime Minister is more powerful so we did have to take the title. But we 
also wanted it.” (Villager 5) 
“If they want to clear my land now, I can show the paper.” (Villager 12) 
The satisfaction with the PLTs is especially understandable when taking into account 
that the villagers are witnessing the lengthy CLT process for years now with no sign of 
success so far – and even worse, already lost some land to the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang 
ELC.  
As the PLTs were only issued for farmland that lies within ELC areas, some villagers 
are hoping that they might receive a PLT for some of their land in the near future as 
well because more and more land conflicts with ELCs are arising (cf. Interview Villager 
4, 5, 16). 
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However, the villagers were not aware of the fact that by law, the PLTs could interfere 
with the success chances of Samot Leu’s CLT application, of which most of them did 
not have any knowledge anyway (cf. Interview Villager 6, 8, 10-16). Then again, no 
evidence could be found that the PLTs are in fact hindering the ongoing CLT process 
as ICSO and the DLMUPC only named other reasons for the length and complexity of 
the respective application (cf. chapter 4.1.2). 
Criticism on the PLTs comes mostly from stakeholders outside the village: For instance, 
it was pointed out that the PLTs were implemented because the RGC realized that the 
rising number of land conflicts could have a negative effect on the outcome of the 
general election. Consequently, the PLT scheme was supposed to win back some votes 
from the people affected by land conflicts (cf. Interview MRD). Moreover, PLTs make 
it easier for their owners to sell their land, which might be done to get money on a 
short term (cf. Interview MRD). Additionally, PLTs can easily be used as collateral to 
get a loan from a bank. Yet, this practice might result in a loss of the land when it 
needs to be sold in order to fulfil the payment requirements (cf. Ngin et al. 2016: 14). 
One interview revealed however, that a land certificate issued by the village chief was 
also sufficient to use as collateral for borrowing money at a private bank (cf. Interview 
Villager 7). 
Be that as it may, all asked villagers stated that they would not sell their land even if 
the company would make them an offer because they want to keep it for themselves 
and their children as a necessary basis for survival (cf. Interview Villager 3-16):  
“If I sell my land, this means that I would sell my pot.” (Villager 16) 
4.1.5 Perception and reality of the current land titling schemes 
Aside from the incomplete awareness of the implications of the PLTs, the interviewed 
Indigenous Peoples were mostly not informed about the definition of a CLT and CPA.  
Of course, during the above-mentioned meeting with SCW, the DoE and the LWS at 
Samot Leu, the CPA concept was discussed and the villagers became aware of the long 
term benefits of a CPA title because it serves as a tool for forest preservation. 
However, there were only around 23 villagers present at the meeting (cf. participant 
observation at Samot Leu). The interviews that were conducted at Samot Leu one week 
later revealed that only 1 out of 16 interviewed villagers was aware of the CPA concept 
(cf. Interview Villager 14). There was also no knowledge on the current status of the 
respective applications and some villagers did not even know that the village engaged 
in CLT and CPA requests (cf. Interview Villager 6, 8, 10-16).  
     
	
Large-scale land acquisitions in rural Cambodia | 33
This demonstrates that the RGC’s and the NGO’s distribution of land rights related 
information reaches just a few village representatives and there is definitely no area-
wide knowledge of land rights and titling opportunities among the Indigenous Peoples 
of Samot Leu. Considering the numerous land related laws and directives as well as 
the different and in parts overlapping working areas of the NGOs that come to the 
village for assistance, it is understandable that the Indigenous Peoples struggle to keep 
up with the titling schemes, as the bureaucracy of the application procedures is usually 
far off their daily reality of life (cf. Interview DoE; Interview Villager 5, 8, 10, 12-16). 
Be that as it may, the villagers of Samot Leu did draw the conclusion that they need 
an official land title to defend themselves as they experience daily the negative 
implications of being surrounded by ELCs. The desirability of private titles that was 
found in the interviews (cf. chapter 4.1.4) shows that land security is a key concern 
but that this goal does not necessarily need to be achieved in the form of collective 
ownership. Either way, the villagers are usually unable to take the pertinent steps of 
action as they do not possess the necessary means and knowledge on how to get a 
secure land title (cf. Interview Villager 2, 7-9, 14-16): 
“If I had a title, I could show the paper and say ‘this is my land, you cannot 
take it’ […] If I knew how, I would apply for a land title.” (Villager 2) 
This lack of information becomes even more dangerous as some villagers seem to not 
just have insufficient but also incorrect information on land titling: Some think that a 
land title issued by their village chief would protect them sufficiently, even though 
this is not a lawfully title but rather serves to distribute land areas within the village 
to prevent disputes among the villagers (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 
1, 3-5, 8, 9, 13). Only one villager explicitly questions the informal character of a land 
title by the chief, pointing to corruption even within the village: 
“A government title would mean safety, but a title from the chief is not 
powerful enough. Because when the company would give money to the chief 
and the chief would agree, the land would be gone.” (Villager 11)  
All in all, the main problem of the land titling situation in and around Samot Leu is 
that the already issued Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC is overlapping with community 
land. However, the community was so far unable to legally claim this overlap area 
because the CLT request is still on-going. In fact, the success of both the CLT and CPA 
requests are unclear, not just due to the already granted ELC but also due to the nature 
of the applications (see figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Overlapping land titles and title requests for and around Samot Leu Village (Source: own compilation based 
on data from Interview SCW, Interview ICSO and Open Development Cambodia n.d. b) 
First, some of the responsibilities of the assisting NGOs are overlapping and they are 
working in the same area using different maps that do not match each other. For 
instance, it is unclear if the protected forestland that is requested in the CLT 
application should be granted additionally to the forestland of the CPA request. These 
circumstances might lead to complications when the requests are submitted to the 
decision making authorities. Second, the requested areas are conservation zones, 
which is especially impedimental for the granting of the CLT that eventually entails 
clearance activities when it comes to an agricultural and residential use of the land. 
In the aggregate, except for some PLTs issued to only a few villagers for their personal 
farmlands, the current situation leaves the villagers of Samot Leu with no legal land 
certificate to claim ownership of their community lands. 
4.2 The impacts of the ELC on Samot Leu Village 
The already granted ELC in combination with the lack of a land title for Samot Leu 
Village to defend their communal lands holds several implications for the livelihood 
situation of the villagers. Those implications can be categorized into socio-economical, 
cultural, environmental and infrastructural changes, which will be analysed in this 
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chapter. Primarily drawing on insights gained through the interviews with the villagers, 
the partially differing viewpoints and arguments of the government authorities on this 
matter will be presented afterwards. 
4.2.1 The villagers’ perception of change 
All interviewed villagers are aware of the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC that is 
overlapping with their land (cf. Interview Villager 1-16). 
In order to understand the impacts of the ELC on the villagers of Samot Leu, it is 
important to consider the relevance of land for the Indigenous Peoples of Cambodia. 
One villager emphasized this relevance by a comparison with the western way of life:  
“Where you [the researcher] come from, it is different. You need work to 
survive. Here, you need land to survive, land is life.” (Villager 11)  
From this it can be concluded that land is closely linked to Indigenous Peoples’ identity 
and can be interpreted as the focal point of their livelihood. This holds true for the 
cultural as well as the socio-economic aspects of life. 
In regard to the socio-economic sphere, the villagers stressed that their land is their 
essential means to survive as they grow food on it (cf. Interview Villager 1, 2, 7, 9, 
10). When asked about the changes resulting from the conflict with the Rat Sokhorn / 
Zumvang company, the main problem identified by the villagers was the loss of reserve 
land for future generations as the village population is growing (cf. Interview CPA 
Committee Member 1; Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 1-16): 
“Life will be difficult for the children in the future because there will be no 
more land left for them.” (Villager 8) 
In this context, a link between the availability of the disputed land area and the 
village’s survival came up quite often during the interviews (cf. Interview Villager 1, 
2, 4, 5, 8, 11-16): 
“Land makes us alive. If we have no land, we will die.” (Villager 2) 
This problem of a shrinking availability of land resources will lead to cultural changes 
as well because the daily life of the next generations is very likely to change and thus 
will be characterized by a less close relation to land: 
“When I was younger, I could get my own land, but my grandchild might have 
to work for someone else because land is rare and expensive.” (Villager 5) 
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However, concerning the topic of culture, not just the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC but 
rather all surrounding ELCs can be seen as causing factors contributing to a 
deterioration of traditional beliefs and rituals among the villagers. Generally, the 
villagers believe that trees are the houses of spirits and that once one cuts a tree and 
thereby destroys the spirit’s home, it leaves. The large-scale deforestation activities 
within ELC areas all around Samot Leu led the villagers to believe that most of the 
spirits left the area already (cf. Interview Villager 8, 10). Even before the here 
examined ELC was granted to Rat Sokhorn, the villagers lost their spirit forest around 
ten years ago due to other agro-industrial deforestation activities (cf. Interview 
Villager 1, 8, 14).  
However, the villagers’ land management is still shaped by those spirits, who are 
believed to watch over the land and the people. So most of the interviewed villagers 
still perform different ceremonies and traditional animal sacrifices when building a 
new house and cultivating a new field or farm. They also believe in the relevance of 
their dreams in terms of crop yield and choosing the right spot for a field or farm. In 
turn, bad incidences and illnesses are associated with spirits as well (cf. Interview 
Village Chief; Interview Villager 1-6, 8, 12, 14, 15). Nonetheless, the interviews 
revealed that nowadays, the practice of traditional land related rituals becomes less 
important, especially for the younger generation (cf. Interview Villager 9-11, 13, 14, 
16). 
The finding that the villagers’ main problem concerns the life of their children’s 
generation may lead to the conclusion that their current livelihood situation is not as 
much affected – an interpretation that proved to be incorrect because the villagers 
are already experiencing changes due to the neighbouring ELCs: 
As forestland was and still is diminishing, the villagers changed from their slash and 
burn agricultural practices to a stationary form of crop farming and strategic plantation 
(cf. chapter 3.1). They also have difficulties to find sufficient wood, which they need 
for house construction and handicraft, because the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang company 
prohibits them to cut trees within the ELC area (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview 
Villager 1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13-16). Furthermore, ELC induced deforestation caused a loss 
of hunting grounds as well as areas for NTFP collection (cf. Interview Village Chief; 
Interview Villager 1-4, 6, 7, 11, 13-16).  
Besides, the villagers cannot let their cattle run freely anymore because if they do and 
company workers find it within an ELC area, it might be shot by the workers since it 
can cause damages to the plantations (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 
1).  
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Additionally, some villagers pointed out that sometimes rivers are being blocked by 
the companies and that waterways are more polluted due to the use of chemicals 
within the companies’ agro-industrial plantations (cf. Interview Villager 6, 10, 12, 14), 
resulting in problems for the villagers’ fishing activities (cf. Interview Villager 1, 7, 10-
16). Moreover, this pollution is also an environmental impact of ELCs, adding up to the 
overall loss of vegetation due to ELC induced deforestation5 (cf. Interview Villager 4, 
12, 15). 
As a last point, it was mentioned that the company blocked some roads with barriers, 
restricting the mobility of the village population and thus worsening their 
infrastructural situation (cf. Interview Villager 1, 2, 10, 11, 13). 
The above-mentioned changes result in a slow alienation of land in terms of cultural 
rituals and severely impair the socio-economic situation of the villagers, leading to an 
overall feeling of insecurity, which the villagers expressed by their fear that even more 
land will be lost to the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang company (cf. Interview Villager 5, 8, 
10, 11, 14, 16)6. 
4.2.2 The authorities’ perception of change 
While the villagers only identified negative changes, some provincial authorities as 
well as some representatives of the national ministries emphasized how ELCs can 
function as a means for development. 
To be precise, they stressed that ELCs can bring infrastructural improvements to the 
area, such as new and better roads, health centres and schools (cf. Interview 
Lumphat). However, those improvements could not be identified for the case of the 
Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC. Quite the contrary, the afore-mentioned road blockages 
can be seen as a degradation of the infrastructural situation of Samot Leu. 
Additionally, the benefit of employment creation was brought forward by some of the 
interviewed authorities (cf. Interview Lumphat; Interview DoE; Panel Discussion MoE). 
Mr. Seieng Sokny, Governor of the Lumphat District, claims: 
																																																								
5 The statement on environmental impacts of ELCs is based on the villagers’ perception and not on a 
scientific assessment, which would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6 One has to acknowledge that the villagers do not perceive all ELCs in the same negative manner: While 
they unanimously painted a negative picture of the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC, they have a more positive 
perception of the Vietnamese Kao Su Ea Lev BM JSY Ltd. company, which owns a ELC close to the village 
as well (cf. Interview Village Chief 2016; Open Development Cambodia n.d. a). According to the villagers, 
this company engaged in a dialogue with the villagers, allowed them to hunt and collect NTFP within the 
ELC boundary and gave them some material gifts such as clothes and fish sauces (cf. Interview Village 
Chief; Interview Villager 1-3, 5-9, 12, 13, 15, 16). However, this company is involved in another land 
conflict, in which it is accused to have cleared parts of another village’s community land (cf. ICSO 2011: 
para. 2). 
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“ELCs create job opportunities and thus prevent the migration of Cambodians 
to other countries for work.” (Seieng Soky, Lumphat District) 
This argument is in accord with the benefits of ELCs as defined in the law (cf. chapter 
2.1) but does not hold true in this case: First, there is just one person of Samot Leu, 
who has a job at the Zumvang company (cf. Interview Villager 3, 8). The villagers 
stated that they were not offered a job but that the majority of them would also not 
want to work at the company anyway due to poor working conditions and because they 
prefer to work for themselves, on their own land (cf. Interview Villager 3, 5-9):  
“Working for someone is a bad life but if you have your own land, it is yours, 
you make your own living.” (Villager 5) 
“In the company, you have 7 to 12 working hours. But if you work for your 
family on your land, you are free.” (Villager 6) 
Some authorities are aware of the fact that this particular ELC does not result in an 
income generation for the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu (cf. Interview LWS), and 
that in general, the ELC companies often hire workers from outside the area (cf. 
Interview MRD). 
So, if the alleged advantages of ELCs in the form of employment creation and 
infrastructural improvements are not in any way a reflection of the reality in this case, 
how does the RGC still justify the existence of ELCs in the area? When asked why ELCs 
were granted in Protected Areas like the LWS at all, Mr. Chou Sopheak, the MoE’s 
Director of Protected Areas east of the Mekong River, commented at a panel 
discussion:  
“We wanted to build a green wall. Now the companies contribute to 
environmental protection.” (Mr. Chou Sophark, MoE) 
He specified his statement by explaining that in the past, Protected Areas often 
suffered from encroachment and illegal logging by indigenous communities, so the ELCs 
were granted around the community boundaries in order to prevent villagers from 
those illegal practices (cf. Panel Discussion MoE). 
The question of the economic benefits of ELCs for Cambodia – especially considering 
the comparatively low rental fees that the companies need to pay – was answered by 
Mr. Chou Sopheak as well:  
“I am not an economist, but I think it depends on the crop […]. As long as they 
[the ELC companies] produce local products and export them, we can impose 
tax on that.” (Mr. Chou Sophark, MoE) 
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However, the vagueness of this statement by a representative of the ministry that used 
to grant ELCs and the lack of availability of transparent numbers on the economic 
revenues, leaves room for doubt on the actual advantages of ELCs. 
4.3 Resistance, resolution and the element of power 
Having established how the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC is affecting the Indigenous 
Peoples of Samot Leu, the following chapter will take a closer look at the acts of 
resistance employed by the villagers and the attempts of resolution that were made 
until the end of the fieldwork phase, i.e. the end of November 2016. Afterwards, the 
conflict situation will be analysed with regard to the element of power. 
4.3.1 Acts of resistance and attempts for resolution 
The starting point of the conflict was the granting of the ELC on land that the villagers 
claim to be their reserve land, even though they only learned about the ELC when the 
company started to clear parts of the area (cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1; 
Interview Villager 8, 11; Interview ICSO) – an act that can be seen as the point, which 
led the villagers to take action. 
While the Indigenous Peoples would describe their resistance to be targeted at the 
company because it is the trigger of their anger, it is indirectly also targeted at the 
government as a secondary target because the villagers are aware that the company’s 
presence is only possible due to the RGC’s approval (cf. Interview Villager 1, 8). 
However, resistance against the RGC is usually not carried out openly and people often 
do not dare to publicly criticize the government. According to Mr. Siphat Touch from 
the MRD, this is because “the democratic idea just starts to mainstream” and many 
Cambodian people’s mind-set is still characterized by the belief that “simple people 
have to respect higher people” (Mr. Siphat Touch, MRD). This interpretation gets 
underpinned by some interviewed villagers being scared to protest, e.g. because they 
do not speak Khmer or think that they are powerless if someone richer comes and 
wants to take their land (cf. Interview Villager 2, 6, 15). 
 
The villagers of Samot Leu employed institutional as well as non-institutional 
resistance tactics. They went to the border of the disputed area around three times, 
protested peacefully and tried to stop the company from further bulldozing (cf. 
Interview CPA Committee Member 1; Interview Village Chief; Interview Villager 1, 3-
5, 8, 10, 13-16; Interview ADHOC; Interview ICSO). When these institutional tactics 
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were not successful and the company cleared parts of the overlap area anyway, the 
tension between the villagers and the company erupted. As a result, non-institutional 
tactics were employed: Some villagers stated that they went to the ELC border, set 
fire to company buildings and fled the scene afterwards (cf. Interview Villager 2, 5). 
As none of those strategies were a success, the villagers employed the probably most 
common institutional strategy in the context of land conflicts in Cambodia: the 
involvement of NGOs. In this case, the villagers called the NGOs LICADHO, CLEC and 
ADHOC for help (cf. Interview Villager 4; Interview ADHOC; Interview LICADHO).  
This strategy can be described by what Tria Kerkvliet names advocacy politics (cf. 
chapter 3.3). Hence, the NGOs are functioning as advocates for the villagers, trying to 
support their claim and to find a conflict solution by filing complaints with the 
provincial authorities and facilitating negotiation meetings (cf. Interview ADHOC; 
Interview LICADHO). All NGOs favour alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms 
instead of involving the national court system, which is known to be corrupt (cf. 
chapter 2.4 and 3.3). According to Mr. Kit Touch, this preference does not just apply 
to the NGOs:  
“The companies feel the same as the communities in this matter: they both 
don’t trust the government; they don’t want to spend more money [on the 
government to solve the conflict].” (Mr. Kit Touch, CLEC) 
However, he states that corruption is also prevalent in Cambodia’s sub-level 
government entities, meaning that companies might pay off local authorities to solve 
a land conflict in their favour (cf. Interview CLEC). 
The representatives of the CPA Committee stress the importance of joint stakeholder 
meetings as well – not just in terms of conflict resolution but also for the purpose of 
raising awareness among the villagers on the different land titling possibilities and 
procedures (cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1; cf. Interview CPA Committee 
Member 2). In this case, ADHOC, LICADHO, ICSO, SCW and CLEC held several joint 
stakeholder negotiation events with the participation of local authorities, the 
company, the community and representatives of the RGC, aiming at finding a solution 
that is acceptable to all parties involved (see table 5). 
At the meetings, different options like finding another reserve land area for Samot Leu 
Village or cutting the disputed area out of the ELC and giving it back to the village 
were discussed. Yet, the proposed alternative areas did not satisfy the villagers 
because of worse soil quality or due to a new conflict potential as the proposed land 
was classified as Protected Area (cf. Interview LICADHO; Interview SCW; Interview 
CLEC). The company did not give in either – quite the contrary, they argued that the 
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NGOs had no grounds on being involved in the conflict and blamed ICSO for wrongfully 
mapping of the region (cf. Interview CLEC 2016). 
 




- Conflict resolution meetings on CPA Seda
o Attended by representatives of SCW, Rat Sokhorn company and the 
MoE 
o Collection of GPS data by the MoE 
19.5.2016 - NGO meeting between SCW, LICADHO and ADHOC to find a solution for 
the conflict 
6.6.2016 - NGO meeting between ICSO, SCW, LICADHO, ADHOD and CLEC to 
understand the nature of the land conflict 
o Discussion of the development that the company started bulldozing 
the land under a new name (from Rat Sokhorn to Zumvang) 
22. & 
24.6.2016 
- 2-days-Seda Peace Table on the land conflict
o Attended by 14 participants, including representatives of the 
MLMUPC, MAFF, provincial authorities, NGOs, the company and the 
village 
16.8.2016 - CPA land conflict mediation meeting
o Attended by 26 participants, including villagers, representatives of 
the company, the DoE and the LWS 
o Zumvang company promised not to advance any bulldozing until 
the authorities found a solution 
11.10.2016 - CPA land conflict meeting at Samot Leu Village
o Attended by villagers, SCW, representatives of the DoE and the 
LWS 
o Decision made to exclude the CPA-ELC overlap area from the CPA 
request 
Table 5: Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) events (Source: own compilation based on Interview SCW 2016; Interview 
CLEC 2016) 
Since it lies in the nature of ADR mechanisms that they do not possess any authority 
and legitimacy to make binding decisions, none of the meetings was able to come up 
with a final solution. At the end of the fieldwork phase, the most recent status 
concerning the negotiations was an agreement made in August, saying that the 
company will not clear further land until a final solution is reached (cf. Interview 
LICADHO; Interview SCW). 
So, if the ADR methods failed to solve the conflict, why did the responsible state 
authorities not make a binding decision so far? 
One key problem are weak institutions when it comes to the implementation of the 
regulations outlined in the national Land Law: There are no guidelines to ensure that 
these regulations are put into practice on the local level so land conflicts are bound to 
occur (cf. Interview MRD). These conflicts are difficult to solve afterwards because 
there is no transparent decision mechanism on who should get the right to the land 
and because responsibilities of government entities, who are involved in the land 
sector, are overlapping vertically between different national and subnational levels as 
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well as horizontally within both (cf. Interview LWS; Interview Lumphat; Interview DoE; 
Interview DRD; Ngin et al. 2016: 32). As a result, the information needed to solve the 
land conflict in this case is distributed among different authorities, leading to a 
stagnation of the solution finding process as responsibilities partially overlap, tasks are 
being pushed back and forth and decisions are made on a higher level without sufficient 
knowledge of the situation on the ground (cf. Panel Discussion MoE). As Mr. Siphat 
Touch describes the problem, “the government needs to do more research to 
understand what is happening and what is the challenge before they are doing 
something” (Mr. Siphat Touch, MRD). 
Since the conflict resolution is stagnating on the side of the government entities, the 
company is less likely to compromise as well, because the company’s willingness to 
concede largely depends on the RGC’s behaviour and on the question if its reputation 
is on the line (cf. chapter 3.3). Yet, neither seems to be the case: the public pressure 
is currently not big enough to be a serious threat to the company’s reputation and the 
company can still refer to its contract with the RGC that grants it the official right to 
the land.  
One can conclude that the resistance of the villagers and the ADR methods of the NGOs 
managed to postpone a further clearing of the disputed land area but all efforts seem 
not to be strong and effective enough to reshape the behaviour of the company and/or 
to bring about change in the government’s priorities. Thus, the villagers fear that the 
company will resume their clearing activities at the end of the rainy season because 
no written agreement was made so far (cf. Interview Villager 1, 3, 4, 10, 12, 14, 16; 
Interview Village Chief). The NGOs are also sceptical of for how long the company will 
halt their activities because the ELC contract includes a binding timeframe for the 
agro-industrial development of the land, which the company needs to follow (cf. 
Interview LICADHO; Interview ICSO; Interview LWS).  
4.3.2 Power imbalances 
Given the fact that the Cambodian law outlines that Indigenous Peoples possess a right 
to their communal lands (cf. chapter 2.5) and that this right needs to be respected 
when it comes to the granting of ELCs (cf. chapter 2.1), one should think that there 
would be enough grounds for Samot Leu Village to successfully claim back the disputed 
area, especially since they are receiving NGO support for around nine years now. The 
previous chapter already argued that one of the reasons why this is not the case are 
weak institutions and overlapping responsibilities among government entities. Apart 
from these explanations, the argument of power needs to be further examined. 
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More precisely, an asymmetrical distribution of power among the different parties 
involved in the land conflict can be observed, causing an unequal distribution of the 
ELC’s benefits and losses to the disadvantage of Samot Leu. What becomes most 
evident is that the villagers possess the least power even though they are living on and 
using the land in question for the longest time. They are completely aware of their 
dependency on the RGC to concede and of their weak bargaining position caused by a 
lack of a formal land title as opposed to the official land title owned by the company 
(cf. Interview CPA Committee Member 1), even though they do not completely 
understand the underlying reasons for the current developments: 
“If the government comes to help us, it [stopping the company from further 
clearing] will work; if the government does not help us, it won’t work.” 
(Villager 10) 
“We only see the company coming and clearing the land. We don’t see what is 
going on behind this.” (Villager 1) 
The frustration that goes hand in hand with this awareness of powerlessness is shown 
by the following statement:  
“Maybe we are like chicken for them [the government and the company]: If 
you want to kill them, you kill them, if not, not.” (Villager 1) 
Consequently, the villagers have different perceptions on if the RGC will support them 
in the conflict: While some doubt that the RGC will act in their favour, because so far 
“it is only talk and no results” (CPA Committee Member 1), others hope that Ly Thuch, 
the national representative for Disaster Management and national focal person for 
rural issues in Ratanakiri, will come again to the village (as he did in 2015) to make a 
binding boundary agreement with the company (cf. Interview Village Chief; Interview 
Villager 3-5, 8, 12, 16). 
The company on the other hand is in a good bargaining position because it can always 
refer to the ELC contract, which officially grants them the right to the disputed land 
area. As stated in chapter 3.3, the company’s reaction to resistance largely depends 
on the reaction of the government. This lends credence to the interpretation that land 
investments bear some risks for genuinely working companies in Cambodia as well due 
to the arbitrary and thus partially unpredictable law enforcement on behalf of the RGC 
– one example being the recent reduction of ELC contract durations from 99 to 50 years 
(cf. chapter 4.1.1). However, the fact that in this case, the company managed to 
perform some kind of ownership transfer, which is generally forbidden (cf. Interview 
MRD), as well as the lack of government pressure on the company to solve the Samot 
Leu conflict, are indications for the large scope of action, which the companies seem 
to possess in Cambodia’s land sector. 
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The RGC possesses the most power in this scenario but several signs cast doubt on if 
the RGC uses this power for the welfare of the population: First, the fast-tracked ELC 
process contrary to the slow and complicated CLT process point to the RGC favouring 
the companies over the communities in land conflicts. This assumption is backed up 
by the lack of an adequate law enforcement when it comes to the implementation of 
the ELC regulations that would at least partially consider environmental and social 
concerns. The final indicator are hints to the widespread issue of corruption in 
Cambodia’s land sector as companies seem to have strong ties to powerful political 
elites:  
“My concern is that some [people working at the MLMUPC] know very well […] 
which land can be sold to local investors to make money with it – corruption 
can be an issue.” (Mr. Siphat Touch, MRD) 
The final stakeholders in this scenario, the NGOs, function as advocates for Samot Leu 
Village by facilitating meetings, enforcing ADR mechanisms and initiating land titling 
requests. Yet, their decision-making power is limited so they can either try to convince 
the RGC to relent or they can try to create enough public pressure that forces the RGC 
to give in. During the fieldwork, it became evident that both tactics are employed by 
different NGOs as they follow slightly different working philosophies: For instance, 
LICADHO and ADHOC are known for a more confrontational approach, involving open 
protest in front of the Council of Ministers’ Office (cf. Interview CLEC). Yet, Mr. Kit 
Touch, Senior Officer of the Governance Programme at CLEC, thinks that such an 
approach causes the RGC to cancel negotiation events and drop land conflict cases 
completely. So instead, CLEC tries to build trust and a good relation to the government 
level to remind them of their responsibility towards the local communities while at 
the same time providing legal consultation to the communities (cf. Interview CLEC). 
Both tactics might have their justification, but they also cause the NGOs to appear as 
no unified front. As Mr. Siphat Touch from the MRD put it with regard to the work of 
Cambodian NGOs in general, “they often don’t work together, even on the same goals” 
(Mr. Siphat Touch, MRD). In combination with the lack of consultation between the 
involved NGOs in terms of the CPA and CLT applications (cf. chapter 4.1.5), this might 
weaken their power potential even more. 
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5 Discussion 
As introduced in chapter 1, the superordinate research question of this study is what 
kind of relationship occurs between different actors of society and land as a resource 
in the context of asymmetrical power relations within the here examined land conflict. 
To shed light on this particular actor-land nexus, the following chapter will synthesize 
the results analysed in chapter 4 with the literature review of chapter 2 and discuss 
these findings by putting them into the analytical framework and research perspective 
of Political Ecology presented in chapter 3. 
5.1 The relationship between non-state actors and land as a resource 
The relationship between the non-state actors on the one hand and the land resources 
on the other hand can be described as a reciprocity, which is shaped by the different 
stakeholders’ interests in the disputed land area, the use of land resources that takes 
place as these interests are transformed into action, and the resulting environmental 
change that then again takes effect on the actors. In this chapter, this general 
description will be filled with content for the here analysed case of the Samot Leu land 
conflict. 
In terms of land, the relevant entity are 2,000 ha7 of forestland, which form the 
overlap area between the Rat Sokhorn / Zumvang ELC and the communal land of Samot 
Leu (cf. chapter 4.1.1). Regarding the non-state actors, one can differentiate between 
three main stakeholders: (1) the Rat Sokhorn and later Zumvang company, (2) the 
indigenous population of Samot Leu Village, and (3) the five different NGOs, who are 
involved in the current land titling procedures and conflict resolution events. Of 
course, it needs to be kept in mind that defining these interest groups is an act of 
generalization. For instance, in the case of Samot Leu Village, intra-community 
tensions and clashes of opinion are probable, but lie beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Thus, the simplistic definition of interest groups serves as a necessary tool for further 
analysis and interpretation. 
So what interest does each stakeholder have in the respective land area? Both the 
company and the village have a direct interest in the form of an appropriation of 
nature. This appropriation has – depending on the stakeholder – a different scale, 
intention and impact on nature. 
																																																								
7 Based on the fieldwork interviews, it was decided to define 2,000 ha as the relevant size of the overlap 
area, even though the analysis of the ongoing land titling requests in chapter 4.1 suggest that the overlap 
area might be even bigger than 2,000 ha. 
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In case of the company, the intention is an agro-industrial exploitation on a large scale, 
which is characterized by an extensive deforestation and eventually rubber and cashew 
nut cash crop plantations, resulting in a severe environmental change in the area. 
Thus, the land possesses primarily a commercial value for the company and the 
expected output are monetary benefits, probably resulting from selling the lodged 
timber and exporting the crop – however, this is just a speculation based on the 
assumptions made by the interviewees and previous studies because the company itself 
was not open to an interview. 
Regarding the villagers of Samot Leu, their interest in the 2,000 ha in question concerns 
the near future scenario of a growing village population, who will need the disputed 
land area as a livelihood basis. The use of this land will thus eventually be 
characterized by a deforestation as well because it would mainly serve as land for 
cultivation, apart from a smaller area that is planned to be used as residential land. 
Hence, the impact on nature would be less invasive compared to the company’s plans 
as the deforestation would probably take place on a smaller scale, but the 
consequence would also be an environmental change for this particular area that would 
entail a loss of vegetation. The expected output is a secured livelihood, both physically 
and spiritually: Physically in the form of a secure place to live and fields and farmland 
to grow food on, and spiritually because a close relation to the land including the 
exercise of land related rituals could be maintained if the respective area would be in 
the possession of the villagers. 
The five NGOs do not have a direct interest in the land but because they function as 
advocates for the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu (cf. chapter 4.3.1), it can be 
concluded that they are supporting the same interests. However, even though a deeper 
analysis of the NGOs’ intentions lies beyond the scope of this thesis, considering their 
different working spheres, ethics and approaches, small differences can be observed: 
For instance, SCW’s commitment for the establishment of a CPA reflects their focus 
on the conservation and preservation of natural resources, while ICSO also supports 
the villagers’ need for land to cultivate. 
Comparing the opposing interests of the company and the villagers it becomes clear 
that they are incompatible and mutually exclusive, at least if every stakeholder insists 
on their expected output. The results of research objective (1), i.e. the identification 
of the land titling situation in the target area (cf. chapter 4.1), showed that the 
interests of the company currently outweigh the ones of the villagers because the 
company possesses the legal right to the disputed area as they own the ELC contract, 
while the CLT for Samot Leu is still in progress.  
     
	
Large-scale land acquisitions in rural Cambodia | 47
Turning to the question of how the relationship between the non-state actors and the 
land resources will finally turn out, i.e. by which stakeholder’s interest the particular 
approbation of nature will be shaped, a third entity needs to be considered: the state 
and its land policy enforcement. 
5.2 The state as an actor 
The state possesses the power to make the decision on which interest group should 
have the right to the disputed land area. As the state has no interest in directly using 
the land, it needs to be considered what benefits the state expects from the two 
scenarios of awarding the land right to the company or to the village, i.e. what indirect 
interests the state possesses in the land. 
The results of research objective (2), i.e. analysis of the implications of the ELC for 
the villagers (cf. chapter 4.2), made clear that this particular ELC brings no positive 
developments for Samot Leu. Consequently, the only positive output that the RGC 
could expect from taking sides with the company is an enhancement of state revenue 
through taxation, potentially gains from corrupt practices such as bribes, and the 
propagation of an image, which shows Cambodia as an investment-friendly country. 
On the other hand, the output for the RGC from taking sides with the villagers would 
be a self-sufficient rural population as well as a preservation of indigenous culture and 
traditions. Additionally, an environmentally sustainable use will probably rather be 
given when the land is used by the Indigenous Peoples compared to the large-scale 
plantation of the company. 
 The analysis of resistance, resolution and power imbalances within research objective 
(3) revealed that all signs point to the RGC favouring the first scenario over the second 
one, i.e. acting in support of the company (cf. chapter 4.3). The reason for this 
inclination becomes clearer when coming back to Political Ecology and Robbins’ 
threefold definition of the state in terms of (1) a simplification of environmental 
issues, (2) a predisposition to external influences, and (3) a control of the prevalent 
development model (cf. chapter 3.3). All three characteristics can be detected for the 
case examined in this study:  
First, the justification of ELCs as a “green wall”, which is supposed to serve as a 
protection against illegal logging by the Indigenous Peoples (cf. chapter 4.2.2), can be 
interpreted as an example of the RGC’s simplification of environmental issues because 
this argumentation shows a severe understatement of the environmental impacts of 
ELCs. Generally, it is questionable if logging for the purpose of home construction and 
subsidence farming done by Indigenous Peoples can be defined as illegal encroachment 
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at all. And more importantly, it remains debatable if the encirclement of indigenous 
communities by ELCs is the right way to secure Protected Areas from illegal logging 
since ELCs themselves inevitably involve large-scale deforestation. This doubt is 
supported by some reports on companies that use ELCs to cover up their engagement 
in illegal logging activities in- and outside their ELC area (cf. Interview ADHOC; 
Interview Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung). Another example of the ecological simplification by 
the state is the classification of land areas as state property – or more generally, as 
land of public interest. This can be seen as an appropriation of nature by the state 
itself, which does not have a direct interest in the land but uses this (re-)classification 
as a tool to exercise the power of decision over land areas regardless of whether they 
are inhabited or protected by land titles. 
Second, the RGC seems to be unable to provide convincing numbers on the economic 
benefits of ELCs and continuously holds on to ELCs’ alleged advantages of employment 
creation, infrastructural development and economic value, despite the existing 
evidence that states otherwise (cf. chapter 4.2.1). Moreover, the state fails to force 
the companies to comply with the ELC preconditions and to concede when faced with 
land conflicts like the one of Samot Leu Village. This lends credence to the 
interpretation that corruption and the involvement of high ranking personalities play 
a major part in land deals, allowing a glimpse at to what extent the RGC is prone to 
external influences and incentives. On the other hand, the influence of the NGOs’ 
advocacy and lobby work for Indigenous Peoples’ land rights seems to be not strong 
enough to change the RGC’s political course, even though there is a big coverage of 
the issue by different organisations (cf. chapter 4.3.2). 
Finally, the above-mentioned understatement of the environmental impacts of ELCs 
and the continuous propagation of their alleged benefits, shows that environmental 
protection is no priority of the RGC, but that it is rather using its power to propagate 
a development model shaped by economic business growth and opportunities, 
representing Cambodia’s ongoing neoliberalisation. 
5.3 The actor-land nexus 
Combining the above-described relationship between the non-state actors and land 
with the role of the state, the result is a complex actor-land nexus, in which the RGC 
determines the outcome of the land conflict by the (non-)enforcement of its own laws 
(see figure 15).  
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As the RGC seems to favour the company (cf. chapter 5.2), it uses its available 
regulatory tools, i.e. the granting of an ELC or a CLT, in a way that allocates power to 
the companies rather than to the villagers.  
Thus, the villagers are left in a position that gives them nearly no scope of action as 
the pace and outcome of their efforts to receive a land title depend on other 
stakeholders: These are the NGOs, who have not yet succeeded in bringing about a 
fundamental change in the RGC’s actions and the state authorities, who often work 
inefficiently due to overlapping and unclear defined responsibilities (cf. chapter 4.3). 
Furthermore, at the local level they usually do not possess the necessary knowledge 
and power to make binding decisions in land conflicts. Moreover, the case of Samot 
Leu revealed that even if power would be decentralized, different local authorities 
have different perspectives on whether the villagers or the company should get the 
right to the disputed area (cf. Interview Lumphat; Interview DLMUPC). 
 
Figure 15: The actor-land nexus in the context of the Samot Leu land conflict (Source: own compilation 2017) 
 
This bias is in line with the local authorities being confident about the success chances 
of the CPA while being sceptical about the CLT request, even though by law, both titles 
are not eligible for the respective area. 
So what is missing is a qualified public administration to develop a coherent land use 
plan with the participation of the people, who actual live on the land, as well as strong 
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institutions, which make sure that consultations are taking place to avoid land conflicts 
in the first place and if they do occur, that they are solved in a just, transparent and 
accountable manner. 
In the aggregate, the actor-land nexus is characterized by different attempts of an 
appropriation of land, all of which underlie different direct or indirect interests, 
chances of success and forms of realisation, depending on the respective actor. The 
resistance tactics employed by the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu as well as their 
engagement in the CLT procedure can thus be defined as defensive because they are 
basically a reaction to the land use change brought about by political decisions in the 
course of a neoliberal development model, which forced the Indigenous Peoples of 
Samot Leu to engage in the contemporary state system in order to pursue their 
traditional life style outside of this very same system. 
6 Conclusion: Changing the face of Cambodian land policy? 
When looking at Cambodia as a prime example of large-scale land acquisitions to the 
detriment of the local population, the narrative of the bad company versus the good 
local people is ready to hand in the current public discourse and in lots of previous 
studies. But in order to understand Cambodia’s land policy that goes hand in hand with 
a growing number of land conflicts as well as to find sustainable solutions for those 
conflicts, it is necessary to think about what is really causing the conflicts. This is why 
this study tried to move beyond the popular argument of blaming the company to a 
more holistic approach: Through the use of Political Ecology it was possible to show 
which value land as a resource possesses for each of the involved stakeholders and how 
these values are transformed into action, leading to an environmental change that 
then in turn takes effect on all stakeholders. The key element when it comes to the 
outcome of the interplay between these different interests is the state and its specific 
land policy enforcement. Consequently, the state is as much a major driver of land 
acquisitions in Cambodia as the companies are, because it possesses the power to 
reshape the land law enforcement in support of the Indigenous Peoples but does not 
make sufficiently use of this decision power. 
So if the most pressing challenges that arise alongside the growing number of large-
scale land acquisitions – like the security of rural livelihoods and a sustainable use of 
natural resources – should be solved, the question of good governance needs to be as 
much addressed as the one of corporate social responsibility (CSR), because so far, it 
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seems that an enforcement of the latter is depending on the existence of binding 
regulations as well as punishments in the case of non-compliance. 
To address these issues and make land acquisitions a win-win situation, a wide range 
of stakeholders is calling for an internationally accepted code of conduct, which should 
include principles of transparency, respecting (customary) land rights, sharing of 
benefits, environmental sustainability and adherence of national trade policies (cf. 
von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009: 3 f.; Quizon 2012: 16). However, in order to make 
such a code of conduct work, strong institutions that supervise and control the 
implementation and compliance with all principles are needed – a precondition, which 
Cambodian land related institutions do not fulfil so far. Moreover, it is doubtful that 
investors and the RGC will follow such (voluntary) guidelines when they do not even 
follow compulsory domestic and international laws that already exist. Enforcing these 
existing regulations requires a clear distribution of responsibilities within the different 
governmental bodies, vertically as well as horizontally. To avoid a failed planning that 
does not sufficiently take into account the local realities, a decentralization of power 
as well as a stronger knowledge basis would be necessary. A step in this direction could 
be the Environmental Code, which was put before the Environment Minister for final 
approval on 25 December 2016. This code aims at aligning different policies with regard 
to agriculture, fisheries and protected areas and at bringing the RGC and the 
communities together to protect Cambodia’s natural resources (cf. Down 2016 a). 
However, critics fear that this will only be another law that looks good on paper but 
lacks sufficient implementation – a fear that is backed up by a new draft of the 
Agricultural Land Law, which will give the MAFF the power to classify any land in 
Cambodia as agricultural land and lease it to companies in arrangements similar to 
ELCs (cf. Down 2016 b). 
Probably the most pressing precondition for an improvement of the land policy 
situation is a strong political will. On the one hand, this holds true for international 
stakeholders like the World Bank or the European Union (EU), who are calling for 
increased investments in agriculture, an opening of borders for trade and capital and 
who continue their technical and financial support for in parts controversial land 
registration programmes in Cambodia (cf. Oldenburg & Neef 2014: 64 f.; Springer 2009: 
271) and thereby providing incentives for practices like ELCs. This is why these 
stakeholders should take a pro-active role in assuring that international regulations 
and standards in terms of human rights compliance and environmental sustainability 
are realized (cf. Global Witness 2009: 58; LICADHO 2009: 17; Global Witness 2013: 34). 
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On the other hand, a national political will is required from the RGC, which needs to 
make sure that its own laws are enforced because the alleged overall goal of poverty 
reduction will not be reached if the RGC continues to encourage an exploitation of 
natural resources, which creates a revenue that only benefits the ruling elite and does 
not translate into an improvement of the livelihood situation of “the poor”. 
This thesis does not deny the importance of increased investments in agriculture. 
However, these investments need to be adapted to the specific cultural, social, 
economic and environmental context, and the findings of this study cast serious doubt 
on whether ELCs as they were put into practice in the past are an appropriate way for 
these investments in Cambodia. Instead, a shift from large-scale land investments and 
export markets to small-scale investments and their potential for national markets, 
food security and poverty reduction could be useful (cf. Liversage 2010: 6 f.; Bickel & 
Löhr 2011: 33-35). Moreover, this study showed the importance of considering the 
specific value of land when thinking about land investments and land conflicts: Looking 
at the relationship of the Indigenous Peoples of Samot Leu with land, it becomes clear 
that for them, land is not just “ground” for agricultural and residential purposes. In 
fact, the relationship is also characterized by a co-existence with the forest around 
the villagers that forms their livelihood basis as they use it for NTFP collection or 
hunting as well as to connect with the spirits they believe in. Thus, land conflicts often 
cannot be simplified to a modern way of thinking in boundaries, which could be drawn 
around the lands that the villagers are currently using for agriculture, so that the 
remainder can be leased out to companies, because this way of thinking does not do 
justice to the Indigenous Peoples’ traditional way of life.  
All these issues need to be sufficiently studied, transformed into available knowledge 
and taken into consideration by the national level when they are formulating and 
issuing new regulations and directives, which are at the moment characterized by 
overlapping and partially contradicting content and arbitrary enforcement. So far, the 
RGC lacks the above-mentioned necessary political will and instead promotes an 
increased commodification of land by employing a narrative of national economic 
development, employment creation, poverty reduction and infrastructural 
improvement to justify the desirability of large-scale land deals in the form of ELCs. 
Changing this narrative and initiating a shift of the RGC’s priorities will be a long 
process and requires not just the continuous efforts of the civil society advocating the 
rights of the local population, but also decisive actions against the wide-spread 
corruption, with which the best drafted land policies are useless. 
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